Building Queensland’s Future

This Interim Report makes two recommendations.

These are for the Queensland government to:

After more than 50 hearing days and evidence from over 80 witnesses, I am satisfied that there is an urgent and pressing need to make these recommendations. I have now heard extensive and, at times, highly disturbing, evidence of misconduct by the CFMEU and a damaging policy of the former Queensland government known as BPIC.

At the core of these recommendations is the introduction of the Recommended Code. The Recommended Code sets certain standards and expectations in the workplace that ought to be uncontroversial. They are uncontroversial because they are aimed at: practices that ensure compliance with the law; cost, efficiency and productivity; achieving and maintaining high standards of work health and safety; and innovation and continuous improvement. These are sound policy objectives. They are particularly so for the building and construction industry, where large sums of taxpayers' money are at play.

The Queensland government is a large consumer of building and construction services. It is typical of state and federal governments in this regard. But its ambitious and unprecedented pipeline of anticipated expenditure, some $119 billion over the next four years, underscores two things:

The Recommended Code answers the call here on both fronts.

As to the first, governments do not have infinite resources at their disposal. It is the taxpayer who provides the government with funds in respect of which prudent resourcing decisions must be made. Cost blowouts on major project constructions are notorious. Indeed, I have heard evidence of such blowouts in respect of the Cross River Rail project, the Centenary Bridge project and the Gold Coast Light Rail project. Ultimately, it is the taxpayer that wears the cost here.

As to the second, the Recommended Code is not a novel idea. Indeed, as Section 6 of this Interim Report explains, such instruments of change have been in place variously for close to 30 years. And, as instruments of change, they have been largely directed to the type of objectives which the Recommended Code aims to address.

Indeed, the initiative is not novel to the State of Queensland. The 2013 Qld Guidelines represent a classic example of those instruments of change. The Recommended Code is modelled on those guidelines. But the 2013 Qld Guidelines were short-lived. The election of the Palaszczuk Government saw their removal in 2015, apparently without any consultation with industry and, in the words of Counsel Assisting, “seemingly in the dead of night”.¹

In simple terms, parties who wish to secure Queensland government funded work will be obliged to comply with the Recommended Code. These are the contractors and sub-contractors who engage labour. They are also the parties who may face union opposition to these objectives. Should they yield to such opposition, they risk the loss of future Queensland government building and construction work.

BPIC was an example of this purchasing power tool. But BPIC was predominantly directed to different ends from the codes of the past, and the Recommended Code. BPIC was a high-cost policy. It mandated higher wages. It mandated certain restrictive practices. It emboldened the CFMEU in its quest for control of large publicly funded civil construction projects. Something of a “turf war”, a battle for union membership, ensued between the CFMEU and the union traditionally associated with the civil construction industry in Queensland, being the AWU. That turf war manifested itself in undesirable ways.

In this regard, I note the recent acknowledgement by the CFMEU Administrator that “[t]he CFMEU in the past has behaved appallingly in relation to the AWU. No matter the merits of the demarcation argument, there can be no excuse for the physical and mental intimidation of officers of another Union.”²

BPIC effectively mandated its requirements across and down the contracting supply chain. As the evidence stands, the model was developed in DHPW and spread to other departments and agencies; and this occurred in the absence of public consultation and without precise modelling.³ The reasons for this government policy will be the subject of the Final Report. So too, the Final Report will detail BPIC’s actual effects on certain projects.

However, based on evidence of the cost associated with the BPIC policy on three projects which I have heard to date, namely the Cross River Rail Project, the Centenary Bridge Upgrade, and the Gold Coast Light Rail Project, I estimate that the cost of the BPIC policy on government infrastructure projects to be 20%, which I consider to be a conservative estimate

The Recommended Code represents something of an answer to BPIC. Indeed, it has a specific provision requiring contractors to identify improvements as against BPIC-driven outcomes, amongst other things. It has many other requirements that aim to reinforce its objectives.

Union parties have challenged the evidence relied on to support the Proposed Recommendations. Accordingly, they oppose the Proposed Recommendations. They provide a contrast with the views of other industry stakeholders who, in general terms, support the introduction of a code and regulator. But for the reasons identified in this Interim Report, and as summarised in Section 5 of this Interim Report, I make the recommendations set out above.

This Interim Report provides a background to the establishment of the Commission (Section 2 of this Interim Report), followed by an explanation of the Terms of Reference which provide for the scope of the Commission’s inquiries (Section 3 of this Interim Report). An overview of the hearings conducted and evidence to date is at Section 4 of this Interim Report. In Section 5 of this Interim Report, I provide a “roadmap” which sets out the basis for my recommendations. This serves as a summary of my reasons. In Section 7 of this Interim Report, I cover the way in which the process of hearings and submissions in relation to the ‘Code’ case study, the principal material relied upon here, unfolded. The parts which follow provide a more detailed explanation of my reasons.

The Commission of Inquiry into the CFMEU and Misconduct in the Construction Industry was established by an order in council that commenced on 1 August 2025 (Commissions of Inquiry Order (No. 2) 2025).⁴ The Commission’s Terms of Reference are set out in paragraph 3 of that order.

By the making of the order, the Governor in Council appointed me as Commissioner. The Terms of Reference explain that I am entrusted with the conduct of an inquiry into matters which are of substantial public importance affecting Queensland’s construction industry. In the performance of my functions and the exercise of my powers, I am to ensure that the inquiry is conducted fully and carefully and in an open and independent manner.

The Commission was directed to provide a report, together with recommendations arising from its inquiries, to the Premier, the Deputy Premier and the Attorney-General. The Commission’s Final Report was originally required to be delivered by 31 July 2026.⁵ Following amendment of the Order in Council, the reporting date was extended to 3 December 2027 to enable further investigation of the significant volume of evidence received and the broad range of issues falling within the Commission’s mandate.⁶

The Commission was established against a background of longstanding and escalating concerns about unlawful conduct, governance failures and misconduct within parts of the construction industry and, in particular, within the CFMEU. Those concerns emerged over many years through court proceedings, regulatory action, independent investigations and media reporting. Collectively, they raised serious questions about whether unlawful conduct had become entrenched in industry practices, whether existing systems of accountability were adequate, and whether misconduct was affecting the lawful, safe and productive operation of an industry of critical importance to Queensland.

Between 2019 and 2024, the CFMEU and its officers were found to have contravened federal industrial laws on at least 1,163 occasions across 62 proceedings, resulting in penalties exceeding $10.6 million.⁷ At least 25 of those contraventions occurred in Queensland, attracting penalties of approximately $4.57 million against the CFMEU and a further $1 million against individual officials.⁸

Those concerns were amplified by judicial observations in proceedings involving the CFMEU. In 2016, Mortimer J, now Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia, concluded that the regularity with which the CFMEU abused its industrial power permitted only one inference: that there was “a conscious and deliberate strategy” to engage in disruptive, threatening and abusive behaviour towards employers, with those responsible “impervious to the prospect of prosecution and penalties”.⁹ Those observations raised an issue of fundamental importance: whether contraventions of the law had come to be regarded not as exceptional failures, but as an accepted means of pursuing industrial objectives.

In 2024, the “Building Bad” investigation by The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian Financial Review published allegations of corruption, criminal infiltration, intimidation and misconduct within the CFMEU¹⁰ On 14 July 2024, the Nine Network’s 60 Minutes program aired these allegations on free to air television.¹¹ In response, the CFMEU engaged Geoffrey Watson SC to undertake an independent investigation into the Victorian allegations, leading to the publication of an interim report which contributed to ongoing concerns about governance, culture and accountability in the construction industry.¹²

The seriousness of the allegations led to extraordinary intervention by the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments. On 23 August 2024, the then Commonwealth Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus KC, placed the Construction and General Division of the federally registered CFMEU and its branches into a scheme of administration, appointing Mark Irving KC as Administrator.¹³ This included the Queensland and Northern Territory Divisional Branch of the CFMEU.¹⁴ On 24 August 2024, the Queensland Minister for Industrial Relations placed the Construction and General Division of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy, Industrial Union of Employees Queensland into a scheme of administration, with Mr Irving KC as Administrator.¹⁵ On 22 May 2026, Michael Crosby AM replaced Mr Irving KC as Administrator, following Mr Irving KC’s resignation.

In February 2025, the Administrator of the CFMEU commissioned Geoffrey Watson SC to investigate allegations of violence and misconduct within the Queensland CFMEU. Mr Watson SC’s Violence in the Queensland CFMEU Report alleged a culture of intimidation, coercion, bullying and violence, together with threats against workers, public officials and others.¹⁶ Mr Watson SC also observed that his investigation may have “only scratched the surface of the violence in the Queensland CFMEU”.¹⁷

The publication of the Violence in the Queensland CFMEU Report was the immediate catalyst for the establishment of the Commission. In announcing the Commission, the Queensland Government described it as a landmark investigation into allegations of systemic violence, intimidation, misogyny and bullying exposed in the report.¹⁸

The reports prepared by Mr Watson SC remain significant to the Commission. The Order in Council establishing the Commission expressly requires that the Commission have regard to the Violence in the Queensland CFMEU Report, together with associated reviews and investigations.¹⁹ In the course of hearings, the Commission also published Mr Watson SC’s Rotting from the Top Report,²⁰ which had not previously been made public. At this stage, the Commission has not treated the findings, opinions or conclusions expressed in those reports as determinative of any issue arising for consideration. Rather, the reports provide allegations, intelligence and evidentiary leads that are being independently investigated and tested through the Commission’s own processes and the exercise of its statutory powers.

The allegations giving rise to the Commission extend beyond the affairs of any single organisation. They concern the integrity, governance and lawful operation of Queensland’s construction industry. The issues raised by Mr Watson SC’s reports, the subsequent interventions of the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments, and the establishment of the Commission each reflect the seriousness with which those matters have been regarded.

The significance of the Commission is heightened by the critical role of the construction industry in Queensland’s economic and social development. The industry is central to Queensland’s infrastructure pipeline, delivering housing, transport, health and community infrastructure, including for the Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games. At a time of substantial population growth, housing demand and infrastructure investment, the integrity, productivity and lawful operation of the industry are matters of direct importance to Queensland’s future prosperity.

The Commission’s Terms of Reference are broad in scope and of substantial public importance. While the Terms of Reference identify specific matters for investigation, those matters are united by a common concern: the integrity, safety, productivity and lawful operation of Queensland’s construction industry. The Commission’s task is therefore not confined to examining alleged misconduct, but extends to investigating the persons, organisations, practices and conditions that may have caused, facilitated or sustained it; its consequences for individuals, industry and the Queensland community; and the reforms necessary to protect the integrity, productivity and lawful operation of the industry.

The first and most extensive area of inquiry in the Terms of Reference is at paragraph 3(a). That paragraph concerns evidence and allegations of misconduct by the CFMEU against people employed in or otherwise involved in the Queensland construction industry.²¹ The Commission is examining not only alleged acts of misconduct, but also the culture and behaviour by which such misconduct has been tolerated, accepted, promoted, fostered or encouraged.²² While the Terms of Reference place particular emphasis on the CFMEU, the CFMEU is not the sole focus of the Commission, which is also examining misconduct in the construction industry perpetrated by others, including circumstances in which the CFMEU or its members may themselves have been victims of misconduct.²³

“Misconduct” is defined broadly.²⁴ It includes any act (or threat of) or omission that amounts to abusive, blackmailing, bribing, bullying, corrupt, criminal, harassing, inflammatory, intimidatory, menacing, misogynistic, offensive, threatening, uncooperative, unlawful, violent or otherwise morally reprehensible behaviour. It also includes any scheme or arrangement designed to circumvent any law. The breadth of this definition reflects the Commission’s responsibility to examine misconduct in all of its forms, including conduct that may not be confined to a single incident, actor or contravention, but may form part of a wider pattern or method of operation.

The Terms of Reference also direct attention to the consequences of misconduct, including its impact on stakeholders’ physical, mental and financial wellbeing and whether it made workplaces unsafe or uncomfortable for women.²⁵ These matters concern the ability of workers, contractors, public servants, inspectors, journalists, employers and other participants to perform their work safely, lawfully and without intimidation or reprisal. The Terms of Reference also identify specific matters for examination, including whether misconduct was systemic in nature and involved current or former CFMEU leadership figures;²⁶ whether intentional, deliberate or reckless breaches of the law formed part of the CFMEU’s business model;²⁷ and whether organised crime or other criminal elements were involved in the affairs of the CFMEU or the construction industry.²⁸ The Commission is also directed to inquire into the payment of personal penalties by the CFMEU;²⁹ financial irregularities;³⁰ the activities of the “Youth Crew”;³¹ the use of social media to facilitate misconduct;³² and the role of labour hire enterprise agreements, State laws or policies alleged to have rendered construction uncommercial.³³

Paragraphs 3(b) and (c) require the Commission to examine conduct that may have contravened a law, policy or professional standard to procure an advantage or cause a detriment,³⁴ as well as payments or benefits arising from contracts, arrangements, understandings or dealings that may amount to misconduct.³⁵ These provisions recognise that improper conduct may occur through transactions that appear commercial or industrial in form but involve coercion, undisclosed influence or abuse of power.

Paragraph 3(d) separately directs the Commission to examine the misuse of CFMEU power and misconduct directed towards non-union enterprise bargaining employers. This concerns the lawful (or unlawful) exercise of industrial power, the integrity of enterprise bargaining and the capacity of employers and workers to make choices without improper pressure or detriment.

Paragraph 3(e) requires the Commission to examine the effects of misconduct on the Queensland workers’ compensation scheme;³⁶ productivity in the Queensland economy and construction industry;³⁷ public and private infrastructure;³⁸ housing;³⁹ and transport infrastructure and its timely delivery.⁴⁰

These issues assume particular significance in the context of Queensland’s substantial infrastructure and construction program. As outlined in Section 2.2.10 of this Interim Report, Queensland has a significant pipeline of transport, housing, community and public infrastructure projects, including projects associated with the Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The Commission is required to examine whether misconduct identified in the Terms of Reference has affected, or has the capacity to affect, the efficient, timely and economic delivery of infrastructure of strategic importance to the State.

The Terms of Reference direct the Commission to inquire into four specific transport infrastructure projects and delays in the delivery of those projects. These are: (1) the Bruce Highway; (2) the Gold Coast Light Rail;⁴¹ (3) the Cross River Rail Project;⁴² and the Centenary Bridge.⁴³ The Commission is examining, by reference to the evidence concerning each project, whether misconduct affected or had the capacity to affect its cost, productivity, timing or delivery. These projects represent significant public investments and form part of Queensland's broader transport and infrastructure agenda. Any conduct that undermines their efficient delivery may increase costs to the public, delay the realisation of economic and community benefits, diminish productivity outcomes and impede the timely provision of infrastructure of strategic importance to the State.

The Terms of Reference also require the Commission to consider whether legislative, regulatory or policy reform is necessary to address matters identified during the Commission’s inquiries. Paragraph 3(f) directs the Commission to examine potential reforms relating to criminal laws, fit and proper person requirements for union officials, measures directed to preventing misconduct, whistleblower protections, and any other changes revealed by the evidence.⁴⁴ Paragraph 3(i) further requires the Commission to consider whether any current or former law or policy enabled or supported the CFMEU. That might include, for example, a law or policy that enabled the CFMEU to engage in misconduct. Together, these provisions require the Commission to assess not only the conduct under inquiry, but also the adequacy of the legal and institutional frameworks intended to prevent, detect and respond to such conduct.

Paragraphs 3(g), (h) and (j) are directed to questions of responsibility, accountability and enforcement. The Commission is required to examine whether any other person or organisation assisted the CFMEU in engaging in misconduct,⁴⁵ whether any individual or entity should be referred to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution,⁴⁶ and whether enterprise agreements entered into with the CFMEU, including labour hire enterprise agreements, were entered into in good faith by all parties.⁴⁷ These matters recognise that misconduct, if established, may involve multiple participants, and that effective reform requires consideration not only of the conduct itself, but also of the arrangements, relationships and governance structures through which it occurred.

The Commission held a hearing on 1 October 2025 to mark the opening of the Commission’s proceedings and to outline its work.

Between 18 November 2025 and 20 November 2025, the Commission held its first public hearing block and heard evidence from Mr Geoffrey Watson SC, barrister and investigator appointed by the CFMEU, and Mr Mark Irving KC, then Administrator of the CFMEU.

To date, the Commission has heard evidence from more than 80 witnesses over a total of 53 days of public hearings.

Witnesses have given evidence in the form of written witness statements and oral evidence in public hearings. To ensure procedural fairness, witnesses were available for cross-examination by parties with leave to appear before the Commission, subject to leave being given to cross-examine a witness, in accordance with the Commission’s Practice Guideline No. 4.

A copy of each witness’ statement is available on the Commission’s website, as is a copy of each document tendered in relation to each witness’ evidence. A transcript of each public hearing day is available on the Commission’s website, as is a recording of each public hearing. Again, those documents have been, and remain, available to ensure procedural fairness to interested parties and ready access to the public.

During the public hearings, the Commission has received evidence from many witnesses who have had dealings with the CFMEU. These have included senior executives from some of Australia’s largest building and construction companies, project directors, senior public servants, subcontractors, construction workers, industrial relations professionals, human resources and safety professionals, regulators, academic experts and former board members of superannuation funds.

Much like other Commissions of Inquiry and Royal Commissions that have come before the Commission, it would be impossible for the Commission to investigate and hear evidence about every instance of misconduct that falls within the scope of the Terms of Reference.

As outlined above in Section 2.2 of this Interim Report, before the establishment of the Commission, the CFMEU Administrator had commissioned Geoffrey Watson SC to investigate violence in the Queensland CFMEU.

Mr Watson SC stated in his Violence in the Queensland CFMEU Report that there is no doubt that “there is violence in the Queensland construction sector and there is no doubt that the CFMEU was a big part of that violence”.⁴⁸ Mr Watson SC observed that the CFMEU has consistently got its way in Queensland both on matters of policy and in practical negotiations through the use of intimidation and threats.⁴⁹

Mr Watson SC concluded that:⁵⁰

The scope of Mr Watson SC’s investigation was confined to violence in the CFMEU in Queensland. It did not extend to the breadth of misconduct that the Commission is required to investigate under the Terms of Reference. Nonetheless, Mr Watson SC’s findings on the issue of violence in the CFMEU in Queensland indicated that there would be widespread, extensive and substantial instances of union misconduct that would require investigation by the Commission.

Indeed, Mr Watson SC said in his report that “I fear this investigation only scratched the surface of the violence in the Queensland CFMEU. There are many other potential witnesses and many other stories which could have been told”.⁵¹

When announcing the Commission on 13 July 2025, the Premier, the Honourable David Crisafulli MP, the Deputy Premier, the Honourable Jarrod Bleijie MP and the Attorney-General, the Honourable Deborah Frecklington MP said in a joint statement that the Commission “will focus on digging deeper into the CFMEU’s systemic violence, intimidation, misogyny and bullying exposed in Watson report”.⁵²

Not every case of misconduct by the CFMEU can be investigated by the Commission. Nor can the Commission hear evidence of every instance of misconduct at a public hearing.

The Commission (with the assistance of Senior Counsel Assisting, Counsel Assisting, the solicitors assisting the Commission, QPS personnel and investigators) was tasked with determining which instances of misconduct would be investigated.

The Commission has received nearly eight million documents in response to notices issued under s 5 of the COI Act. A careful and thorough review of the documents produced in response to notices identified patterns of conduct by unions, or specific union officials or personnel. In some instances, an isolated incident was identified that warranted a closer inquiry.

A significant number of persons have been interviewed by the Commission. The Commission is grateful to each of those individuals. The intelligence obtained from discussions between the Commission’s staff and those individuals has been invaluable. In many instances it has enabled the Commission to identify the appropriate witnesses to give evidence in the Commission.

Throughout the investigative process described above, the Commission was constantly assessing and reassessing the intelligence and evidence it received. Careful judgement calls needed to be made about what matters would be examined further. Some leads did not progress beyond initial investigations. Others were carefully and thoroughly investigated but did not form part of a case study the subject of a public hearing.

The Commission has heard extensive evidence of union misconduct, impacts on productivity, impacts on budgets and costs, alleged regulatory capture and expert evidence in relation to the CFMEU engaging in conduct that exhibits traits associated with organised crime, corruption, and criminal governance.

When selecting the case studies to be examined in the course of public hearings the Commission had careful regard to identifying serious, systemic or widespread allegations of misconduct or disruption. This often involved focusing on significant public infrastructure projects.

Case studies that were ultimately chosen identified conduct or disruption that was so significant it could not be ignored.

Section 14 of this Interim Report focuses on the BPIC aspect of three case studies that were specifically identified in the Terms of Reference, namely the Centenary Bridge Upgrade⁵³, the Cross River Rail Project⁵⁴ and the Gold Coast Light Rail Project.⁵⁵

In setting out my approach to fact finding for the purpose of this Interim Report, I have been greatly assisted by the approach to fact finding as explained by the Hon Dyson Heydon AC KC as Commissioner of the Heydon Royal Commission in his Interim Report.⁵⁶

In that respect, I note the Commission is not a court, nor is its work adversarial in nature. There are no parties, in a litigious sense, and no strict contradictor, although different parties may, at different times in the Commission’s work, take on such a role.

The Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence.⁵⁷ The Terms of Reference contemplate that I will make findings of fact and require me to publish my findings in a Final Report, due to be published in December 2027. The Terms of Reference also permit, but do not require me, to publish an interim report. It is possible that some of my findings in the course of the Commission may cause serious damage to the reputation of a person or organisation. The possibility of that damage requires some standard to be applied in my approach to making findings. Consistent with my obligations to conduct an open and transparent inquiry, I must afford natural justice to any person or organisation if I intend to make an adverse finding against them.⁵⁸

Similarly to the approach taken by the Hon Dyson Heydon AC KC as Commissioner of the Heydon Royal Commission, I have applied the civil standard of proof having regard to the principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw.⁵⁹ That is, I must feel an actual persuasion of any asserted fact,⁶⁰ on the balance of probabilities, taking account of the seriousness of the allegation made, the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of that factual allegation, and the gravity of the consequence that may follow, in order to come to the conclusions I have in this Interim Report.

Although the rules of evidence do not apply, I have used them as a guide where they reflect principles of fairness tested by time. In particular, a person should have notice of a proposition adverse to their evidence before it is relied on, though that need not be achieved in a pedantic way.⁶¹ Moreover, this reinforces the principles of natural justice which also apply to the Commission’s task.⁶²

This Interim Report is being delivered while hearings continue and the findings of fact I make, for that reason, are limited. Many of them are conclusions drawn from documents,⁶³ most notably about what BPIC clauses required or permitted, which I deal with in Section 14 of this Interim Report. Where a document is clear on its face, I have relied on it for what it says.

On limited occasions, when, and only when, a witness has given evidence and was available for cross-examination by those with leave to appear, I have accepted that evidence for the limited purposes of this Interim Report. The evidence about the economic impact of BPIC on particular projects is an example of this, set out in Section 14 of this Interim Report. Further evidence and submissions on these topics may be received in the Commission before the publication of my Final Report. That may result in a closer assessment and more conclusive findings of fact on those issues. But, as at the date of publishing my Interim Report, the evidence to date can reliably show a trend, a range, or a pattern, and that is the only use I make of it here for the purpose of this Interim Report.

I make no findings in this Interim Report against any person or organisation about conduct, which they have not yet had the opportunity to challenge. Where I refer to evidence of such conduct, I do so only by way of illustration of an issue which is relevant for consideration of whether the Draft Guidelines ought to be adopted as contended for by Counsel Assisting.

Some material taken into account for the purpose of this Interim Report is not specifically referred to in submissions or expert reports received in relation to the proposed code, which are summarised in Section 7.1 of this Interim Report. For the reasons set out above, this material is quite limited in scope.

There are many factual questions which I have deliberately not addressed in this Interim Report, as I do not consider it necessary to do so and the findings of fact are best reserved for my Final Report after all evidence is called.

The Terms of Reference provide that I must deliver a Final Report by 3 December 2027 and that I am to determine if any interim reports are to be provided before that date.⁶⁴

I set out below at Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.35 of this Interim Report the seven reasons I recommend that the Recommended Code (Annexure D of this Interim Report) be adopted by the Queensland Government. Namely, this is because:

I have determined that it is in the public interest for this Interim Report to be delivered. This is for the following reasons:

In this Interim Report I make two recommendations:

These two recommendations are designed to:

Firstly: cost efficiency and productivity. The Recommended Code states that one of the objectives of the code is that “[p]rojects are to be delivered on time and within budget with real value for money for the Government and the Queensland taxpayer”.⁷⁰ This objective is found under the heading “Cost efficiency and productivity”.

In support of the objective of achieving real value for money, the clauses of the Recommended Code which purport to give effect to this objective do in fact do so. That the clauses are directed to improving productivity and ensuring real value for money are clear on their face.

For example, through clauses in Part 4 of the Recommended Code, there is an effective anti-“jump up” clause, a prohibition on Workplace Arrangements that restrict the efficient performance of work or productivity improvement, a ban on prescribing or limiting employee numbers, a ban on both “one-in-all-in” arrangements and “no last on, first off” clauses which can otherwise prevent an employer from retaining whom it regards as its best employees in a redundancy scenario.

It stands to reason that individually or collectively these types of clauses are likely to enhance cost efficiency, improve productivity and help ensure value for money. I discuss the importance of cost efficiency and productivity and the likely effect of the Recommended Code in maximising “taxpayer value for money on publicly funded building and construction projects”⁷¹ in Section 11 of this Interim Report and contrast it with the stated objectives and effects of the so-called BPIC policy in Section 14.3 of this Interim Report.

Secondly, the Recommended Code attempts to assist in ensuring the promotion of freedom of association. In support of the objective of advancing freedom of association on construction sites in Queensland, the clauses of the Recommended Code which purport to give effect to this objective do in fact do so. That the clauses are directed to enhancing freedom of association are clear on their face. For example, in Part 9 of the Recommended Code,⁷² there are prohibitions upon “no ticket, no start signs”, “show card days”, mandatory display of union paraphernalia, restrictions upon encouraging or discouraging employees to join a union, the protection of the privacy and identity of personnel, and the requirement to pay a bargaining fee to a union by a non-member.

Many of these clauses simply reflect the existing law, but this does not mean that they are superfluous or unnecessary, particularly where there is presently no Commonwealth regulator dedicated to the construction industry. Individually and collectively, these types of clauses are likely to enhance freedom of association. I discuss the importance of freedom of association and the likely effect of the Recommended Code in protecting freedom of association at Section 12 of this Interim Report.

Thirdly, the Recommended Code seeks to “maintain high standards in workplace health and safety and rehabilitation management and practices”. This objective is found under the heading “Workplace Health and Safety and Rehabilitation”.

In support of the objectives of workplace health and safety, the clauses of the Recommended Code which purport to give effect to this objective do in fact do so. Part 8 of the Recommended Code requires tenderers to demonstrate a track record of delivering construction projects safely, as well as requiring tenderers to have policies in place to demonstrate commitment from senior leadership to health and safety, and demonstrate engagement with workers, employee representatives and regulatory authorities for issue resolution, which are requirements squarely directed to maintaining high standards of workplace health and safety and are clear on their face.

Many of these requirements simply reflect the existing law, but this does not mean they are superfluous or unnecessary as their importance is only enhanced by their reinforcement in the Recommended Code. Individually and collectively, these types of clauses are likely to enhance workplace health and safety. I discuss the importance of workplace health and safety and the likely effect of the Recommended Code in maintaining high standards of workplace health and safety at Section 13 of this Interim Report.

Fourthly, much of the Recommended Code has a history stretching over three decades. One clause in the Recommended Code that is new is clause 5.1(q). The reason I recommend that clause specifically (and the code in general) is to try to ensure that the so-called BPIC policy⁷³ (and the clauses I refer to below) do not continue in operation.

Though it seems counterintuitive, whilst the BPIC policy was abolished on 1 January 2026, the arrangements that it gave rise to might live on. The reason I say that the continuing effect of the BPIC policy and its clauses should cease is not because the Queensland Government has repealed the policy, nor because the QPC has sought to quantify the damage that the policy did, but rather because there is sufficient evidence available to me to reach such conclusions based on:

The stated objectives of BPIC focused on, amongst other things, improving safety and providing work/life balance and a comfortable standard of living to workers, which I set out in greater detail in Sections 14.3 and 14.4 of this Interim Report. This can be contrasted with the stated purpose of the Recommended Code, that is, cost efficiency and value for money for taxpayers.

BPIC clauses, on their face, were apt to entrench restrictive practices, including the requirement that every contractor in the supply chain meet the BPIC conditions (commonly described as “jump up” clauses);⁷⁴ the requirement for direct employment by contractors, restricting a contractor’s ability to efficiently organise their workforce;⁷⁵ fixed, minimum rates of pay, applicable to both the contractor and all subcontractors on-site;⁷⁶ a fixed schedule of 26 RDOs, immovable without union agreement;⁷⁷ fixed hours of work, immovable without union agreement;⁷⁸ and permitted paid union meetings with employees of up to two hours during working time, no more than once per shift.⁷⁹

It stands to reason that individually or collectively these types of clauses are likely to reduce productivity, lead to inefficiency and cause excessive costs to be incurred. I am of the view that the continued operation of these BPIC-era clauses would be antithetical to the productive and effective delivery of Government construction projects in Queensland.

To date, I have heard evidence about the impact of BPIC on costs and delivery through evidence led about three major public infrastructure projects: the Cross River Rail Project, the Centenary Bridge Upgrade and the Gold Coast Light Rail Project.⁸⁰ The evidence to date suggests that each of these major projects was negatively impacted, to a greater or lesser degree, by the implementation of BPIC, which I discuss in Section 14 of this Interim Report.

Dealing only with the increase in costs (and leaving quantification of the delays until the Final Report) caused by the implementation of BPIC upon these projects (and leaving the quantification of the increase in costs and associated delays caused by BPIC on other government infrastructure projects until the Final Report), the evidence suggests that these costs were as follows:

Doing the best I can, and in the knowledge that these estimates are subject to further refinement in the Final Report, my overall conclusion in this Interim Report is based only on these three data points (i.e. these three projects), further evidence is likely to be adduced about other projects impacted by BPIC, and with the awareness that further submissions and analysis directed to this issue in the Final Report may alter this conclusion, I form the view (and I believe this to be a conservative view) that the impact of BPIC upon the cost of the infrastructure projects delivered by the Queensland government during the operation of the BPIC policy was in the order of 10 – 30%. All things considered, I regard 20% as the best available estimate on the current evidence as it stands.

It is not necessary in this Interim Report to form a final view of the exact cost increase that the BPIC policy caused, or the precise impact it had upon the productive and efficient delivery of Government construction projects, in order to recognise that BPIC had a negative impact on significant government funded construction projects since its introduction. The exact quantification can await the Final Report. It is sufficient to note the apparent costs impact on the three projects above, the stated purposes of the policy and the clauses on their face justify in part the Recommended Code, and particularly the new clause 5.1(q) of the Recommended Code requiring work to be done to unwind any entrenchment of these BPIC-era clauses as the new normal for public infrastructure procurement in Queensland.

Relatedly, it is not necessary for me to form a final view about the evidence of Mr Damian Long, Chief Executive and Secretary of the CCF QLD, that BPIC was “the most damaging policy to the productivity of the construction industry and affordability of capital works” that he had come across in his career.⁸¹

Similarly, the QPC modelled the prospective impact of BPIC, if it were to remain unchanged. In my view, it is not necessary to determine at this stage whether the QPC estimates are reasonable as a basis now to recommend the Recommended Code. At the end of the Commission, I will have the advantage of a project-by-project analysis to enable the Commission to assess, in the most rigorous way possible, the actual impact of the BPIC policy over time and across different projects. At that stage, this will likely be the best evidence available, and its basis is different from the task which was set for the QPC.

Fifthly, I have already found⁸² that the clauses contained in the Recommended Code are likely to enhance productivity and deliver greater value for money on government construction projects. This approach is an evaluative not economic approach, and the evaluative approach – at least when it comes to making this type of assessment – is to be preferred. In fact except in detailed, unique and highly controlled situations, an evaluative type analysis is the only real approach one can deploy. The reason is simple: it is very difficult for an economist to isolate one factor from the multitude of other factors that could be sensibly said to contribute one way or another to productivity changes. For example, the factors that might impact upon productivity and cost effectiveness could include the level of capital investment, innovation, skills and education, competition, regulation, labour supply and management practices, among other factors. It is almost impossible to hold all these variables constant and try to isolate the impact of previous iterations at a federal and state level of a code and regulator upon the productivity of the construction industry whether in Queensland or nationally. A great deal of ink was spilled in attempting to show whether there was any causal link between earlier codes and regulators and changes in productivity.

To give an example, how could one say even if there was a causal link between improvements in the productivity of the construction industry in Queensland or nationally and the presence of previous federal or state codes and regulators, that the latter caused the former? How could one ignore, for example, an increase in skills, technological improvement, changes to the health and safety planning or environmental laws? That is just to name a few examples of unstable, disparate variables.

Thus the econometric evidence adduced directly or through witnesses purporting to show some connection between earlier iterations of the code and previous regulatory regimes and changes in productivity, whether introduced by Counsel Assisting or the Unions, is to be given no weight. In this regard, the criticisms of the Unions of the econometric evidence, introduced through Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson, are justified. In Section 16.1 of this Interim Report, I set out the competing contentions as to the so-called link between productivity in the construction industry and previous iterations of the code and regulator and my reasoning in support of my conclusion to reject the econometric evidence.

But, that changes nothing really. Not merely because no party showed or attempted to show that the introduction of a code would not improve productivity. But more substantially because my evaluation of the objectives and content of the Recommended Code remains unaffected by the rejection of the econometric evidence. For example, the question of whether the cumulative impact of jump up clauses, manning restrictions, inflexible RDOs and limitations upon the ability of building contractors to pay and organise their workforce with maximum flexibility, have a negative impact on productivity and value for money only has to be asked to be answered.

These dual conclusions, namely that the econometric evidence is inutile and that the clauses speak for themselves, were in effect supported by the Productivity Commission 2014 report. The report considered that, while using large aggregate metrics was not useful to determine the impact of previous regulators on productivity, it still considered regulators provided positive benefits. These included enforcement reducing the capacity for unions to act on certain stratagems and tactics to gain unreasonable bargaining leverage for high wages and conditions, manning ratios and membership numbers.⁸³

Sixthly, a similar point can be made about the statistical evidence concerning the asserted connection between the presence of a code and regulator and a decrease in industrial disputation and working days lost. It can be accepted that the number of variables impacting working days lost and levels of industrial disputation are less numerous than those that impact productivity but the same point remains. Thus, I give no weight to that statistical evidence but, again, this does not detract from my evaluation. That there is no statistical evidence showing that previous iterations of a code and regulator to enforce it impacted the number of working days lost and the level of industrial disputation is neither here nor there. I have found that the objectives and the content of the Recommended Code on its face are likely to have a beneficial impact upon the cost effectiveness of project delivery and on productivity.⁸⁴ I set out in Section 16 of this Interim Report the competing contentions as to the so-called link between the number of working days lost, the level of industrial disputation in the construction industry and previous iterations of the code and regulator. In doing so, I set out my reasoning in support of my decision to reject the statistical evidence.

Seventhly, I am buttressed in my analysis of the impact of the Recommended Code (notwithstanding the dismissal of the econometric and statistical evidence) by the expert evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson. I have given their evidence much weight because both are highly qualified former regulators with extensive experience working for the ABCC and BCCB. They are two of the most qualified experts in the country to provide evidence of the effectiveness of prior construction codes and regulators of such codes.

Mr Hadgkiss gave evidence of his observations from working in various roles with former regulators that:⁸⁵

Mr Hadgkiss attributed those improvements to the imposition of rules and standards that the industry was required to meet; the incentive of industry to comply with the rules in order to secure further public contracts; and the deterrent effect of a well-resourced regulator.⁸⁶

I found Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence particularly helpful with respect to the impact that the reintroduction of a code could have on the industry, particularly with respect to re-setting expectations of productivity, safety and compliance standards required to be met.

Mr Jenkinson gave evidence that he observed construction companies taking a more active role in complying with the 2013 Qld Guidelines. On this point, Mr Jenkinson stated:⁸⁷

Mr Jenkinson’s evidence on the commercial implications incentivising contractors to ensure compliance on their projects was particularly persuasive to me.

A detailed analysis of the evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson, and my findings in relation to their evidence is set out in Section 17 of this Interim Report.

Taking into account the above reasons, my view is that, on balance, a code and regulator is likely to have a beneficial impact on the Queensland construction industry because such a code and regulator:

Therefore, I recommend a procurement code, together with a regulator (see Annexure A of this Interim Report).

I acknowledge the efforts of the Administrator in seeking to make cultural change within the CFMEU. However, it is too early to tell whether any success here will be enduring. I do not regard it as a reason not to make the recommendations.

Industry codes in the construction industry have been implemented at the Commonwealth level in Australia and in both Victoria and Queensland variously since at least 1997.

“The 1997 [Cth] Code was introduced as an intergovernmental administrative policy, being published jointly by the Commonwealth, State, and Territory Governments”,⁸⁸ and represented the first attempt at a code at the federal level. The 1997 C’th Code established minimum standards in relation to, inter alia, the industrial relations practices of contractors who sought to work on government funded building projects.⁸⁹

As set out in Counsel Assisting’s submissions dated 14 April 2026, with the addition of the 2013 C’th Code and the 2014 Vic Code, the below table summarises the relevant history of industry codes in Australia since 1997:

Scroll to view all columns ↔

Figure 1: Relevant history of industry codes in Australia since 1997

In October 2002, the IBIT was set up following a recommendation in the Cole Royal Commission's interim report for an interim body to be established to monitor conduct in the construction industry, to investigate cases and, if appropriate, to proceed with prosecution to ensure that current laws were being upheld.⁹³

From 2003, there were a number of further reforms introduced by the Howard Government to give effect to the recommendations of the Cole Royal Commission. Those reforms included the introduction of more prescriptive “guidelines” to supplement the 1997 C’th Code; the legislating of the BCII Act; and the establishment of the BIT and, subsequently, the ABCC to enforce the 1997 C’th Code and supplementary guidelines.⁹⁴

Following the 2007 Federal Election, successive Federal Labor Governments progressively unwound the framework that had been established for regulating behaviour in the construction industry. This included the 1997 C’th Code being replaced with the diluted 2013 C’th Code, the ABCC being abolished and the BCII Act being replaced with the FWBI Act.⁹⁵

As that framework was dismantled, a number of state governments sought to implement State based codes to minimise the resulting regulatory gap. The first comprehensive State based code introduced was the 2013 Vic Guidelines, which were complemented by the establishment of the CCCU and were subsequently further formalised in a 2014 Vic Code.⁹⁶ Several months later, the Queensland Government introduced the 2013 Qld Guidelines,⁹⁷ which effectively replicated the content of the 2013 Vic Guidelines and were administered by the newly established BCCB.⁹⁸ Each of the 2014 Vic Code and 2013 Qld Guidelines was short-lived.⁹⁹

Counsel Assisting submitted that the 2013 Qld Guidelines and the BCCB, the regulator of the 2013 Qld Guidelines, were seemingly removed without any consultation with industry, and without any explanation being offered by the then Labor Queensland Government as to why it was taking that course.¹⁰⁰ Counsel Assisting characterised this removal of the 2013 Qld Guidelines and the BCCB as occurring “seemingly in the dead of the night”.¹⁰¹

That submission was supported by the evidence of Mr Jenkinson, who informed the Commission: “I do not recall any particular justification being offered by the State Labor Government for the disbanding of the BCCB, however I recall from my discussions with colleagues and industry that a widely held view was that the Labor Government had disbanded the BCCB at the request of the CFMEU."¹⁰²

For the purposes of the Code Case Study, Counsel Assisting:

During the cross-examination of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson on 11 June 2026, the CFMEU Administrator tendered:

In response to Counsel Assisting’s case, the Unions filed:

Additionally, between 13 July 2026 and 21 September 2026, the Commission received fifteen other submissions from non-parties, including interested industry participants and members of the public. My analysis of this broader group of submissions is set out in Section 10 and Annexure C of this Interim Report.

Counsel Assisting first filed submissions in relation to a proposed code on 14 April 2026.¹⁰⁶ On the same day, Counsel Assisting called Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson to give evidence in support of a proposed code and regulator.

Senior Counsel for the CFMEU Administrator had written to the Commission on 13 April 2026, indicating that the CFMEU Administrator would seek to cross-examine Mr Hadgkiss, but given the volume of material provided to the parties by Counsel Assisting on 8 April 2026,¹⁰⁷ the CFMEU Administrator sought further time to prepare any cross-examination of Mr Hadgkiss¹⁰⁸ and Mr Jenkinson.¹⁰⁹

Counsel Assisting opposed the adjournment of each witness’ cross-examination on the basis that the CFMEU Administrator had sufficient time to consider the material and prepare in advance of the hearing on 14 April 2026.¹¹⁰

Given the matters raised, and the fundamental basis for the CFMEU Administrator’s application was to assist the Commission discharge its inquisitorial function, I allowed the applications to adjourn the cross-examination of Mr Hadgkiss¹¹¹ and Mr Jenkinson.¹¹²

On 11 June 2026, Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson were recalled for cross-examination by the CFMEU Administrator. In the course of cross-examination, the CFMEU Administrator tendered:

At the conclusion of the hearing on 11 June 2026, I set a timetable for Counsel Assisting to file submissions by 3 July 2026 and for any responsive submissions to be filed with the Commission by 24 July 2026.¹¹⁶

On 18 June 2026, the Commission received a formal request from the ETU, CEPU and PGEU for an extension of time until 21 August 2026 to provide submissions and responsive material to Counsel Assisting’s submissions due 3 July 2026.

On 24 June 2026, the Commission responded that while it was minded to afford the ETU, CEPU and PGEU additional time, that needed to be balanced against a timely report and it was unlikely that an extension until 21 August 2026 would be granted.

On 3 July 2026, Counsel Assisting filed submissions. On 4 July 2026, the Commission published an open call for responsive submissions to Counsel Assisting’s submissions, inviting responses by 4pm on 24 July 2026.¹¹⁷

On 10 July 2026, the ETU, CEPU and PGEU reagitated the requested extension of time until 21 August 2026, noting they had briefed an expert economist to assist their responsive submissions. On 15 July 2026, the Commission granted an extension of time for the ETU, CEPU and PGEU to file its material and submissions by 14 August 2026.

At the same time, the Commission and the legal representatives for the CFMEU Administrator corresponded between 10 July 2026 and 15 July 2026 concerning further material sought by the CFMEU Administrator.

On 17 July 2026, the Commission received a formal request from the CFMEU Administrator for certain underlying data relevant to the QPC Final Report and an extension of time to provide submissions and responsive material.

On 21 July 2026, the Commission informed the CFMEU Administrator that it would make enquiries with QPC in respect of the underlying modelling data sought by the CFMEU Administrator, which was done by issuing a notice to produce pursuant to s 5 of the COI Act to the QPC, returnable on 30 July 2026.

On 27 July 2026, QPC requested an extension of time for compliance until 14 August 2026, which was accommodated.

On 30 July 2026, the CFMEU Administrator raised their requested extension before me in hearings and a commensurate extension was granted until 14 August 2026, as was also granted to the ETU, CEPU and PGEU.

On 4 August 2026, the Commission informed the CFMEU Administrator that given the extended time for compliance granted to the QPC until 14 August 2026, the Commission would advise a revised time frame for a further extension after the receipt of that material.

On 14 August 2026, the Commission received the requested material from the QPC, which was provided to the CFMEU Administrator on 21 August 2026, subject to the terms of a non-publication order, and to the ETU, CEPU and PGEU on 25 August 2026, subject to the terms of a varied non-publication order.

On 14 August 2026, the CFMEU Administrator filed 74 pages of submissions, together with 29 pages of annexures, and the ETU, CEPU and PGEU filed 25 pages of submissions and 70 pages of expert material, on the basis that supplementary submissions and expert material could be made after the requested QPC material was made available to them.

Given the timing of the receipt of the requested QPC material, understandably, I granted extensions to the CFMEU Administrator and the ETU, CEPU and PGEU for filing supplementary submissions and expert material until 21 September 2026.

On 25 August 2026, an issue was raised in the hearings as to the constraints of the non-publication order,¹¹⁸ the terms of which were varied on 26 August 2026. Additionally, there was discussion between myself and Counsel Assisting about ensuring that all parties had an opportunity to be heard,¹¹⁹ after which further submissions were received from the Queensland Council of Unions.

On 28 August 2026, the Commission received further correspondence from the CFMEU Administrator about the extent of the material provided, which prompted the Commission to confirm that all material had been provided by the QPC.

On 7 September 2026, the Commission confirmed to the CFMEU Administrator that the QPC had provided all responsive material and the deadline for supplementary submissions and material remained 21 September 2026.

On 15 September 2026, the ETU, CEPU and PGEU raised the need for an additional extension on the basis that an expert engaged had professional commitments which precluded him from providing his report until 24 September 2026, so an extension for filing of this expert material and supplementary submissions was sought until 25 September 2026. The Commission accommodated the requested extension of time.

On 21 September 2026, the CFMEU Administrator filed an 87 page expert report of Gerard de Valence dated 21 September 2026 including annexures as well as 38 pages of supplementary submissions dated 21 September 2026.

On 25 September 2026, the ETU, CEPU and PGEU filed two expert reports, a 26 page supplementary report of Professor Martin O’Brien dated 16 September 2026 and a 35 page expert report of Professor David Walters dated 21 September 2026 as well as 4 pages of supplementary submissions dated 25 September 2026.

On 14 April 2026, Counsel Assisting submitted that the Commissioner should consider recommending:¹²⁰

On 14 April 2026, Counsel Assisting made oral submissions in support of the Proposed Recommendations.

Counsel Assisting filed written submissions dated 14 April 2026 and 3 July 2026 in support of the Proposed Recommendations. A copy of the written submissions is available on the Commission’s website, as is a recording of Counsel Assisting’s opening submissions and a transcript of the oral submissions.¹²¹

In support of the Proposed Recommendations, Counsel Assisting relied on the evidence of:

Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson gave oral evidence in the Commission on 14 April 2026.¹²⁵

On 11 June 2026, Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson were cross examined by Senior Counsel for the Administrator.¹²⁶

In support of the Proposed Recommendations, Counsel Assisting also relied upon:

Counsel Assisting drew my attention to my Terms of Reference, which direct me to make recommendations, including in relation to whether any law or policy change is required.¹³⁴

Counsel Assisting’s submissions and Proposed Recommendations were underpinned by:

In relation to above Section 8.4.2(b) of this Interim Report, Counsel Assisting relied on the evidence of Mr Long.¹³⁷ It was submitted that Mr Long’s evidence was that, rather than supporting a best practice procurement process, BPIC had a negative impact on productivity and increased direct labour costs. Mr Long described BPIC generally as “in effect, a pattern enterprise agreement which was intended to apply to all State agencies”.¹³⁸

Counsel Assisting emphasised Mr Long’s evidence that the BPIC was:¹³⁹

Counsel Assisting submitted that Mr Long’s evidence about the cost impacts of BPIC has some particularly compelling support from the QPC and that paragraph 11 of the Terms of Reference requires me to “have regard to the […] QPC inquiry into construction productivity to ensure there is no duplication of the economic focus of that inquiry”.¹⁴⁰

Counsel Assisting submitted that the QPC Final Report modelled the cost impact of BPIC to the Queensland community, which estimated that the direct costs of the BPIC to the Queensland community have been as high as $19.9 billion, with further, indirect costs of between $4.9 billion and $18 billion.¹⁴¹

Counsel Assisting submitted that the basic premise of a code is that the government will leverage its purchasing power to incentivise contractors to adopt practices that give effect to the government’s priorities: for example, productivity, safety, freedom of association, and compliance with statutory obligations.¹⁴²

It was submitted that a code can make a construction contractor’s eligibility to tender for government funded building work conditional on the contractor complying with the requirements of the code.¹⁴³

It was submitted by Counsel Assisting that this can be achieved by a code generally:¹⁴⁴

As at the date of that submission, the Commission had already received extensive evidence detailing the prevalence of illegitimate and unlawful conduct within the Queensland construction industry.¹⁴⁵

The Commission had also heard how the Labor Government’s BPIC entrenched excess and unproductive work practices on major construction projects. Counsel Assisting submitted that whilst the current Government has put an end to BPIC, many unproductive work practices persist, and productivity in the Queensland construction industry has decreased by 9% since 2018.¹⁴⁶

Counsel Assisting submitted that the evidence suggests that effective codes, administered by a regulator, consistently deliver improvements in productivity, protect freedom of association, and promote compliance with statutory IR obligations.¹⁴⁷

It was submitted by Counsel Assisting that one of the most compelling empirical data points is the number of working days lost to industrial disputes. It was said that, at a federal level, there is a clear statistical correlation between the level of industrial disputation in the construction industry and the implementation of the 2016 C’th Code.¹⁴⁸

In support of that submission, Counsel Assisting relied upon Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence of a clear statistical correlation between the level of industrial disputation in the construction industry and the implementation of the 2016 C’th Code. Counsel Assisting specifically relied upon the following alleged trends:¹⁴⁹

In support of that submission, Counsel Assisting relied upon Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence of a statistical trend in data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics that was said to demonstrate that the number of industrial disputes:¹⁵⁰

I pause to note that I did not accept that statistical evidence I address this in detail in Section 16 of this Interim Report.

Counsel Assisting submitted that the evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson reflects these statistical trends, which is consistent with Mr Hadgkiss’ observation that:¹⁵¹

Counsel Assisting submitted that an industry code will deliver greater improvements in behaviour and productivity when administered by an independent regulator. An independent regulator serves a number of important functions: educating industry participants on the expected standards of conduct; monitoring suspected instances of non-compliance; and, where necessary, instituting appropriate enforcement action (including by recommending that non-compliant contractors be excluded from government funded building work).¹⁵²

It was submitted that the observations of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson as to the need for an industry-specific regulator are consistent with the conclusions of each of the Gyles, Cole and Heydon Royal Commissions, the last of which justified such a recommendation in the following terms:¹⁵³

Counsel Assisting further submitted that given the difficulties in detecting many of the practices and arrangements that a code is designed to prevent, it is also important that the regulator is vested with appropriate coercive powers. The regulator being vested with coercive powers shields a co-operating witness from the criticisms and pressure that might otherwise be applied if the witness’ co-operation was seen as voluntary.¹⁵⁴

In relation to the regulator, Counsel Assisting submitted that the regulator should be an independent body rather than sitting within any government department. Otherwise, the interests of government as a regulator and as a client of construction contractors may come into conflict.¹⁵⁵

Counsel Assisting submitted that the evidence suggests a new regulatory body should be established to perform this role. The existing QBCC lacks the necessary experience and resources to enforce a code of practice relating to workplace relations matters, and indeed a further case study will be presented regarding the CFMEU’s influence on the QBCC.¹⁵⁶

Counsel Assisting submitted that the evidence disclosed three clear justifications for the reintroduction of a code of practice and a regulator:¹⁵⁷

Counsel Assisting submitted that, based on the evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson, the reintroduction of a code of practice and regulator in Queensland would likely improve productivity and reduce project costs in the Queensland construction industry.

It was submitted that the respective evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson in respect of their observations and suggestions was based on their extensive industry experience and the consistent feedback that they had received from other industry participants.¹⁵⁸

Counsel Assisting drew my attention to Mr Hadgkiss’ observation of the impact of a code and regulator:¹⁵⁹

Mr Jenkinson gave similar evidence during cross-examination where he stated:¹⁶⁰

It was submitted by Counsel Assisting that I should accept Mr Hadgkiss’ views as to the potential benefits of a code of practice, which were based on Mr Hadgkiss’ experience as the Commissioner of the ABCC and Director of the CCCU, and on his observations during his tenure at the ABCC and CCCU.¹⁶¹

Attention was drawn to Mr Hadgkiss’ ultimate assessment that a properly designed code:¹⁶²

Counsel Assisting submitted that Mr Jenkinson was similarly definitive in his view that a well-designed code and regulator would drive efficiencies on construction sites. Mr Jenkinson recalled how, during the period in which the 2013 Qld Guidelines were in force:¹⁶³

Counsel Assisting submitted that I should accept that a well-designed code, administered by a properly resourced regulator, has the potential to deliver improvements to productivity and reduce inefficiencies, in the construction industry, in circumstances where:¹⁶⁴

Counsel Assisting submitted that the reintroduction of a code of practice and regulator should not depend solely on the potential productivity and cost saving benefits, but that I should also have regard to other benefits to the construction industry and its participants.¹⁶⁵

Counsel Assisting submitted that Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson gave extensive evidence as to how a code of practice would also serve to protect freedom of association.

Relevantly, Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence on freedom of association was that:¹⁶⁶

Mr Hadgkiss cited discrimination based on union membership, practices that exert pressure on employees to join a union, including “no ticket, no start” signs and practices that suggest “no ticket, no start” as examples of conduct contravening freedom of association. Mr Hadgkiss referred to the High Court decision of Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson (2022) 274 CLR 450.¹⁶⁷

Counsel Assisting also submitted that there are other forms of conduct that infringe the freedom of association, including:

Mr Hadgkiss gave evidence that, in his view, a rule that prohibits the mere affixing of union symbolism to property provided by a company would protect the freedom of association.¹⁶⁹

Counsel Assisting submitted that the following components are integral to the success of any new code:

Counsel Assisting submitted that the evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson established that the regulator:¹⁷⁵

Counsel Assisting submitted that the imminent re-negotiation of a number of significant enterprise agreements covering construction work on many of the State’s largest infrastructure projects means that, without prompt action, there is a risk inefficient and unproductive work practices will become entrenched for a further four years.¹⁷⁶

It was submitted that the significant volume of construction work forecast in Queensland over the coming years amplifies the potential cost to Queensland taxpayers of inefficient and unproductive work practices.¹⁷⁷

Lastly, Counsel Assisting referred to consultation undertaken with industry stakeholders in relation to a discussion paper that was released on 31 March 2026.

That discussion paper was distributed to some 106 stakeholders, who were each invited to lodge written submissions in relation to seven issues.Those issues were as follows:

The feedback provided by the stakeholders has been anonymised, as was promised to participants as part of the consultation process.

Counsel Assisting did not rely on the feedback received,¹⁷⁸ save for the fact that the feedback from industry broadly supported the reintroduction of the code (although the unions did not support its reintroduction) and that the unions had emphasised the importance of measures to advance the recruitment and retention of women (for example, by way of introducing a requirement in WRMPs directed at that aim).

The Commission received two sets of written submissions from the Administrator of the CFMEU, dated 14 August 2026 and 21 September 2026, respectively. The Administrator’s submissions totalled 112 pages, excluding annexures.

The Administrator’s submissions cogently set out the Administrator’s position. I found the submissions helpful and I am grateful to Senior Counsel and Junior Counsel for the Administrator for their efforts in preparing the written submissions.

The Administrator relied on the expert report of Mr Gerard de Valence, filed under a covering letter dated 21 September 2026 (about the QPC’s cost-benefit modelling and productivity data), and the paper of Emeritus Professor David Peetz dated 20 September 2026 (about agreement and award pay rates).

The Commission also received written submissions from:

The submissions from the QCU and the ETU, CEPU and PGEU were similarly helpful and well-reasoned. I am likewise grateful to Counsel for these union parties for their written submissions.

The Administrator opposes the reintroduction of a code and regulator.

The Administrator’s submissions may be summarised, broadly, as follows:

Counsel Assisting’s case did not survive

Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson are not qualified to give economic opinions.

Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson:

Taking into account the above, the only evidence before the Commission of a benefit of reintroducing a code and regulator is the impression of two former regulators who are not economists.¹⁸³

Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson’s opinion evidence consisted of asserted conclusions.

The following material tendered by the Administrator discloses no consistent relationship between the presence of a code and a regulator and productivity in the construction industry:¹⁸⁵

The conclusion from Counsel Assisting’s April submissions (at [23]) – that the Independent Economics report concluded that the BIT and ABCC produced productivity gains of between 10% and 21% – should not be accepted, as:¹⁸⁶

The 2014 Productivity Commission report found no “large aggregate impact” of the BIT/ABCC regimes and warned that “the use of unconvincing evidence of a large effect [of IR changes] may undermine the credibility of proposals for IR policy change”.¹⁸⁷

Days lost is not a measure of productivity; further, the Queensland series covers all industries and the pandemic period, and is not confined to the construction industry.¹⁸⁸

Counsel Assisting focused on the upper end of the QPC Final Report’s range of estimated costs that BPIC caused to the Queensland community.¹⁸⁹

In relation to the QPC Final Report:

The misconduct that the code seeks to regulate is already unlawful.¹⁹⁴

Since the Administrator was appointed, misconduct has ceased or substantially abated.¹⁹⁵

The QCU resists the reintroduction of a code and regulator broadly for the following reasons:

There is an existing and adequate State and Federal regime under the FW Act, the IR Act and the WHS Act which governs the building and construction industry.¹⁹⁶

The evidence on productivity given by Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson is based on personal observations and anecdotal industry feedback rather than empirical data.¹⁹⁷

The macroeconomic data that the Commission received in evidence does not show any correlation between the introduction of the ABCC and improvements in productivity.¹⁹⁸

The code would diminish the role of worker representatives, including by prohibiting non-working delegates, which overlooks the important function of workplace delegates in representing the industrial interests of members.¹⁹⁹

The CFMEU is under administration and significant cultural change has occurred since the Administrator was appointed.²⁰⁰

The Draft Guidelines’ stated urgency is a concern because it suggests the purpose of the code is to directly intervene in enterprise bargaining processes regulated by the FW Act.²⁰¹

The Stakeholder Engagement Report records that there was non-consensus amongst stakeholders and that the question of whether an administering body should be created “remained unresolved”.²⁰²

No compelling case has been advanced for the regulator having coercive powers.²⁰³

The ETU, CEPU and PGEU²⁰⁴ resist the reintroduction of a code and regulator broadly for the following reasons:

There are limitations with the QPC Final Report, on the basis of significant uncertainties in its modelling.

Professor O’Brien’s evidence demonstrated that:

The evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson was uncontradicted by evidence of other witnesses; however, that is orthodox as although parties with leave to appear in the Commission may apply to have evidence tendered or heard, it is the function of Counsel Assisting to obtain and call probative evidence relevant to a Commission’s Terms of Reference, including exculpatory evidence.²⁰⁸

The econometric and statistical evidence given by Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson in relation to productivity trends should be given no weight because neither of them is an economist or otherwise suitably qualified to give an expert opinion on those matters.²⁰⁹

Discrimination based on union membership is already prohibited by the FW Act and Mr Hadgkiss did not give any examples of union officials being emboldened by union paraphernalia on site.²¹⁰

Academic consensus is that HSRs and unions play a positive role in preventative health and safety, even in hostile labour relations climates.²¹¹

Counsel Assisting’s submission that it is “axiomatic that reducing the frequency with which non-essential personnel are moving around an active construction site will in turn reduce the incidence of preventable accidents” on construction sites is:²¹²

Consultation feedback “seemed to be unanimous” against restrictions on union logos, mottos or insignia.²¹³

Mr Hadgkiss accepted that the FW Act’s general protections provisions already apply and that a logo restriction “is itself a restriction on freedom of association”.²¹⁴

The prohibitions on paid union time, non-working delegates and delegates administering inductions are directly contrary to ss 350C and 205A of the FW Act.²¹⁵

The logo prohibition restricts expression under s 21 of the Human Rights Act, and the delegate provisions restrict freedom of association under s 22 of the Human Rights Act.²¹⁶

Apart from the Unions, there were fifteen other submissions received by the Commission that were generally in favour of the reintroduction of a code with a regulator with one party not expressing a view. All submissions are available on the Commission’s website.

However, that support is qualified to the extent that the submissions raised many and varying suggestions as to the content of a code and the work of a regulator. Some of those suggestions were of a general nature and some quite specific. A summary of these is set out at Annexure C of this Interim Report. The Housing Industry Association proposes that the Draft Guidelines only apply to publicly funded building work and, in any event, is concerned that any recommendations of the Commission be reconciled and therefore await the federal government’s proposal to introduce some type of federal building code.²¹⁷ The Housing Industry Association’s request for delay stands it apart from the other non-union party submissions.

The positive support received for a code is reflected in many of the submissions. For instance, the CCF QLD said as follows:²¹⁸

NECA Queensland submitted that:²¹⁹

These views are echoed by the Property Council of Australia²²⁰ and Master Builders Queensland,²²¹ which respectively noted that:

The submissions also made comments in respect of the regulator proposed to put the code into effect. In that regard, the Rosenlund Group²²² and Master Builders Queensland²²³ respectively noted that:

Some of the submissions provided by various industry bodies turned their minds to the impact of the code on the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games. NECA Queensland²²⁴ and the Australian Constructors Association²²⁵ observed, respectively, that:

Finally, in reference to Mr Watson SC’s report, ‘Rotting from the Top’ calling for “an investigation supported with coercive powers”,²²⁶ Master Builders Queensland “believes that this demonstrates the clear need for a powerful industry-specific regulator with coercive powers as a priority”.²²⁷ Further to that, the Queensland Major Contractors Association submitted that a “well-resourced and effective Independent Regulator, able to investigate and pursue right of entry non-compliance in the appropriate courts and jurisdictions, and to refer criminality and corruption to the relevant agency, would act as an effective deterrent”.²²⁸

It is not the intent of this Interim Report to canvass all the submissions made to the Commission. As noted above, they are available on the Commission’s website and a summary of the various suggestions is in Annexure C of this Interim Report. However, the positive sentiment expressed towards a code was, generally speaking, directed towards a number of common themes, as illustrated above.

To the extent that, speaking generally, there is a reasonable degree of support for the reintroduction of a code with a regulator, I am further encouraged to make the Recommendations. That is the extent to which I rely on those submissions.

As to the various suggestions made, I have had regard to them in framing my Recommended Code.

The Recommended Code has four key objectives. One of those objectives is:

This objective is reflective of a commitment to “productivity within the State’s building and construction industry to ensure that the Queensland Government maximises taxpayer value-for-money on publicly funded construction and building projects”. The scale of anticipated Queensland Government expenditure on such projects, as mentioned in Section 5.1.3(b) of this Interim Report above, makes this objective crucial and obvious.

This objective is patently sound. Governments do not have infinite resources at their disposal. It is the taxpayer who provides government with funds in respect of which prudent resourcing decisions must be made. In major construction projects, cost “blowouts” are notorious. Such blowouts are felt keenly by governments in respect of project construction financed by them. This Commission has heard evidence of such blowouts in respect of the Cross River Rail Project, the Centenary Bridge Upgrade, and the Gold Coast Light Rail Project.

In support of the taxpayer value-for-money objective, there are clauses of the Recommended Code which, on their face, give effect to this. This is dealt with in two key parts of the Recommended Code to which I turn to next.

Firstly, Part 4 deals with “Workplace Arrangements”. Sub-clause 4(e) deals directly with avoiding Workplace Arrangements that restrict the efficient performance of work or contain provisions that restrict productivity improvement. The sub-points in 4(e) serve as examples and are not intended to be exhaustive. Subpoints (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) all concern the utilisation of labour and limiting the restrictions on such use.

Subclause 4(e)(i) – No ratios of employees. This prevents a Workplace Arrangement that prescribes or limits the number of employees or workers that a company may engage on a particular site or work area, or within their company in general. It is obvious that fixed resourcing can limit the efficient performance of work where there are insufficient numbers, or otherwise add to cost where there are excessive numbers.

Subclause 4(e)(ii) – No one-in-all-in arrangements. Such arrangements effectively dictate that all workers must have the same working arrangement outcomes (such as in relation to overtime). These too can provide a limit on the effective use of resources. To take the overtime example, where additional work is offered to one individual it must be offered to all in a particular crew or site. Similarly, such arrangements can dictate that the same amount of overtime must be offered to all employees over a particular period of time. Therefore, to get a particular piece of work done comes with baked-in higher cost. Given the costs, a contractor may wish to avoid the overtime being worked. But this could have downstream workflow effects and, in turn, impact the efficiency/productivity of the sequencing of work.

Subclause 4(e)(iii) – “No last on, first off” clauses. This goes to certain selection criteria that ignore an employer’s operational requirements in the context of a redundancy situation. They typically require that longer serving employees be retained in a redundancy situation, at the expense of more recent hires. The impact of such clauses on cost efficiency and productivity is not immediately obvious. However, the impact follows from the inability of an employer to retain its best people for the job as opposed to being based on some arbitrary rule which dictates otherwise. It stands to reason that the ability of an employer to retain its preferred employees is more likely to contribute to better workplace outcomes than would otherwise be the case. Put simply, a recent hire may have proven themselves to be a better performer than a less recent hire. In those circumstances, the employer should not be prevented from retaining the more recent hire in a redundancy situation.

Professor O’Brien (for the ETU, CEPU and PGEU) acknowledged “that Ratios of employees (4(e)(i)) and perhaps RDOs (4(e)(vi)) could have productivity implications, however the others I interpret more as to cost and otherwise as management prerogative rather than productivity.” To the extent any of these relate to cost and the management thereof, the Recommended Code is of benefit and serves its objectives. If the utilisation of labour is to be maximised, and/or cost is to be managed, it ought to be within the prerogative of the employer who is the party responsible for delivering on outcomes.

Part 4 also contains restrictions on Workplace Arrangements that will impact on the cost of the project.

First and foremost, there are restrictions on what are colloquially termed “jump up” clauses. Jump up clauses provide an automatic right to certain terms and conditions (typically pay and allowances) conditioned on working on a particular project. They aim to standardise terms across a project for all relevant workers. As a result, the price of labour is removed as a point of competition amongst subcontractors with subcontractor rates of pay being effectively tied to that of the principal contractor. Clauses 4(c) and 4(d) deal directly with this, thereby creating greater opportunity for competition in the supply of labour.

Clause 4(a) prevents coercion to make over-award payments, whilst clause 4(b) prohibits payments to industry superannuation, redundancy and income protection funds which provide for excess contributions, unless decided by each employer. These clauses are aimed at avoiding a situation where above-minimum contributions are mandated. These go directly to cost.

So too does clause 4(h) which prohibits a mandated right for employees to cease work to attend union activities. Obviously, any time directed away from work as required is unproductive and costly. This prohibition is echoed in Part 9 which prohibits a requirement to employ non-working job delegates. The prohibition here guards against a standing entitlement beyond the existing legal rights that employees have. I say more about non-working delegates in Section 12 of this Interim Report.

Cost is also dealt with in clause 4(k) which deals with the specification of site allowances. This provides for greater clarity and certainty in respect of the setting of site allowances and can be beneficial when it comes to the pricing of labour cost.

I accept that there may well be benefits associated with these types of clauses. The Administrator refers to the “possibility” that minimum manning may be directed to safety, supervision, fatigue management or emergency responses.²²⁹ The Administrator also seeks to highlight the benefit of apprentice ratios,²³⁰ and effectively takes issue with the ability of a contractor to be unrestricted in the engagement of casual and daily hire workers.²³¹ Whether or not there are other benefits, the point remains that, all other things being equal, the presence of such restrictions runs counter to the cost, efficiency and productivity objective on the face of these clauses. To the extent there are safety considerations that bear upon minimum manning requirements, or indeed any other restrictions on the engagement of workers, there are WHS obligations which exist and, as I explain in Section 13 of this Interim Report, which are buttressed by requirements in the Recommended Code.

Secondly, Part 5, under the heading “Cost, efficiency and productivity” includes a requirement for contractors to provide a WRMP as part of any tender response. Such a requirement is not new and is common in major project contracting in my experience. Again, it seems obvious that such a plan, properly developed and adhered to, can yield greater benefits than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, a project owner, such as a government, who is spending large sums of taxpayer money on a major project, is well justified in calling for details of how a contractor will deliver the project on time and on budget from a productivity and cost perspective. Indeed, I regard such a plan as a basic risk management tool in circumstances where the workplace, particularly in construction, carries risk beyond WHS, extending to the all-too-obvious risks of delay and higher cost.

I need not address all of the matters required in a WRMP according to the Recommended Code. There are eighteen specific matters to be addressed and, in respect of four of these, there are further specific matters. A fair characterisation of these requirements is that the vast majority of them are aimed at the taxpayer value for money objective. The following are illustrative examples: sourcing of labour requirements; approach to developing and maintaining a productive workforce (which extends to the approach to managing inclement weather, heat and RDOs); the utilisation of major plant and equipment and the minimisation of unproductive time; the approach to the use of labour hire; the approach to performance and conduct management; demonstrating how the contractor will deliver the project on time and within budget; and demonstrating a track record of delivering construction projects on time and within budget.

It seems plain that a code containing these requirements on contractors will, all other things being equal, provide the opportunity to maximise higher efficiency/productivity outcomes and the potential for better value for the Queensland taxpayer.

Freedom of association was dealt with by Counsel Assisting’s submissions, and various of the Union submissions (mentioned above in Sections 8 and 9 of this Interim Report, respectively). The United Nations recognises freedom of association as an international human right.²³²

It is also recognised in the FW Act, which protects freedom of association by providing that persons are free to become, or not become, members of industrial associations, have their interests represented, or not represented by industrial associations, and are free to participate, or not participate in lawful industrial activities.

Those protections are found in s 336(1)(b) of the FW Act, which relevantly provides that the objects of Part 3-1 of the FW Act are:

It is worth emphasising that freedom of association entails:²³³

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) contained the following explanation in relation to the freedom to associate:²³⁴

Construction employees, as with any employees, ought to enjoy the freedom to choose whether or not to be a member of a union consistent with the law. If they choose to be a member, then it ought to be a union of their choice, assuming of course the union can cover the work they perform under the relevant union rules. The importance of this basic right cannot be overstated.

The potential for this right to be abused warrants the type of requirements set out in Part 9 of the 2013 Qld Guidelines (and in turn the Draft Guidelines). Those requirements provide guardrails against the abuse of this right. They provide that certain practices, by way of example, were inconsistent with the guidelines, which examples are restated below:

As to (c), (e), (g), (h) and (k) above, these merely reflect the position applicable under the FW Act.

As to (a) and (d), these guard against the potential for undue and potentially unlawful pressure being applied to employees upon the commencement of their employment. It remains open to a union to exercise right of entry with a view to having discussions with members and potential members on site. As such, the restrictions posed by (a) and (d) do not prevent unions exercising their lawful rights to recruit members.

As to (b), this effectively supports the legislative objective in circumstances where the practice of enforcing “no ticket, no start” (which is generally understood to mean “no membership, no work”) is unlawful. As such, it is merely a practical application of the current law.

The resolutions of the CFMEU Qld/NT Branch’s 34th Delegates Convention in 2020 record:²³⁵

The running sheet for the Branch’s delegates convention dinner on 18 August 2022 records that Mr Hayden Jones, the CFMEU delegate for Lendlease on the Cairns Convention Centre Project, was awarded the “Joe McDonald Award (No Ticket No Start Award)”.²³⁶ Two years earlier, Mr Jones had received the Branch’s “Outstanding Recruitment” award.²³⁷

Mr Rhys Carmady, Director and owner of Status Signs, a Cairns signage subcontractor engaged on the Cairns Convention Centre Project, gave evidence that Mr Jones regularly pressed Mr Carmady’s employees to join the CFMEU, telling them “[y]ou should sign up” and “you need to sign up”.²³⁸

Similarly, Mr Ryan Creighton, the former Director and operator of Global Hire Services, which supplied equipment to subcontractors on the Cairns Convention Centre Project, gave evidence that his understanding was that “you basically had to have a CFMEU EBA and be a union member to work on site”, although he also stated this was never explicitly said to him.²³⁹

I do not seek to overstate that evidence. A convention resolution is not conclusive proof that such practices were employed on site – it may be that the resolution was never implemented on site. I also note that neither the CFMEU nor Mr Jones has yet been heard on these matters. I make no adverse findings against them.

However, that does not prevent me from observing that as recently as 2020 and 2022, “No Ticket, No Start” appeared to be an objective set by the CFMEU and publicly rewarded. The resolutions are evidence of what the CFMEU sought to achieve and its objectives. Likewise, the “No Ticket, No Start” award is evidence of what the CFMEU chose to celebrate.

The prohibition on “No Ticket, No Start” is dealt with in point (b) above, and is included in the Recommended Code.

As to (f), an employee should not be required to produce evidence of union membership and nor should employers/contractors be so required. If an employee wishes to acknowledge his or her union membership to others, that ought to be a matter of free choice. Conversely, the decision not to be a member and not say anything about this ought to be respected. There might be many reasons why this is so. It is self-evident that union membership can be a sensitive matter when there are differences in views about its merits as between work colleagues. The position is analogous to one’s political affiliations. The potential for discordant views and the obvious unrest that may follow warrants this restriction.

Indeed, the Commission has heard evidence of a CFMEU campaign against the AWU, in addition to repeated instances of aggression by CFMEU members or officials directed to the AWU. For example, the harassment of AWU officials as they departed the Centenary Bridge Upgrade site on 22 February 2024, which was recorded and played during Commission hearings. ²⁴⁰

I make no adverse findings in this Interim Report in respect of the conduct of any particular individuals, but I observe that such alleged conduct is entirely inconsistent with a worker’s right to freedom of association, namely to:

As to (i), there is an obvious interest in having employees perform actual work and for which they are paid. The Commission has heard evidence of non-working delegates and the imposition of non-working delegates in the Toombul Shopping Centre Case Study, but I reserve my factual findings in respect of the Toombul Shopping Centre Case Study until a later time.

The effective ban on non-working delegates must, of course, be read subject to those obligations under the FW Act that afford the right of delegates to perform legitimate union business.²⁴¹

Further, the requirement at (i) effectively extends to allowing employers and contractors to choose their own labour. It stands to reason that if such parties wear the risk of such engagement (be it the quality of work, the degree of output, and of course health and safety), they ought to have the ability to control the recruitment process unencumbered.

As to (j), I consider that the prominent display of CFMEU or other union paraphernalia throughout a site and staff rooms, with the effective sanction of contractors/employers who are in legal control of the site, can create the impression that:

In the Toombul Shopping Centre Case Study, the Commission heard evidence of Mr Broadhurst, the non-working delegate imposed on Rosenlund Contractors, covering the site in CFMEU flags, posters, stickers and branding,²⁴² and that the “staff room walls were also covered in stickers, like a shrine to the CFMEU”.²⁴³ Mr Rosenlund gave evidence that, at least to him, the message seemed to be that upon Mr Broadhurst's arrival, the Toombul Project site had become a CFMEU site and the CFMEU had control of the site and its workers.²⁴⁴ I make no findings about Mr Broadhurst in this Interim Report.

Evidence of a similar nature was heard in Cairns. A CFMEU flag on a tower crane signified a CFMEU site according to a former Operations Manager at WHSQ.²⁴⁵ Safety inspectors believed certain companies were aligned with the CFMEU as they had CFMEU flags and banners on their machinery and equipment.²⁴⁶ The Cairns Convention Centre Project was a unionised site as indicated by CFMEU flags, according to Mr Creighton.²⁴⁷

It needs to be remembered that the “ban” proposed by Counsel Assisting in the Draft Guidelines on union paraphernalia is directed towards an underlying requirement by a union that an employer display such material. The point here is that it is really a matter for those in control of the workplace to determine whether and what logos, mottos, or other signage be present in the workplace.

Where the site is dominated by the paraphernalia of one particular union, then the suggestion is that union membership of that union is expected. The potential for this, and the resultant impact this can have on freedom of association justifies this measure. The inevitable criticism of this requirement that it is “anti-union” is misguided, if not mischievous. If an employer flew flags suggesting it was a “non-union” site, one would expect unions to be rightfully concerned. Given freedom of association extends to the right to not be a union member, why should the converse not be a concern?

The issue of union paraphernalia may require consideration in my Final Report as to whether an outright ban of display of union paraphernalia is a desirable recommendation, but I have not yet formed a view on that issue. However, at this stage I consider that the Recommended Code adequately balances the core of freedom of association, that is, removing any requirement of union paraphernalia display by contractors or employers and reinforcing an individual worker’s freedom of association.

At this point it would be remiss of me not to mention a recent amendment to the FW Act by the federal government. That amendment effectively allows the Commonwealth to discriminate against suppliers to the Commonwealth who do not have an enterprise agreement.²⁴⁸ Without the amendment, it seems that were the Commonwealth to reject a supplier on the basis that they did not have an enterprise agreement with union involvement, this would give rise to a breach of the FW Act. The amendment enables the Commonwealth to, in effect, bypass such a breach. It allows the Commonwealth to favour suppliers who have enterprise agreements involving unions over those that do not. Whilst this does not in and of itself require employees to be union members, the practical reality is that an employer who wishes to secure Commonwealth work will need to make an enterprise agreement involving a union and, in turn, one or more employees will need to be members of that union. The amendment runs counter to the principles of freedom of association. The very fact that it is an express exception to provisions of the FW Act which are otherwise aimed at protecting freedom of association bears this out.

Despite this change, it remains important for the State of Queensland to do what it can to protect this important freedom. Accordingly, I see no good reason to qualify the requirements above aimed at protecting such rights.

As noted above, the Unions’ submissions are to the effect that the code would constrain lawful union activity and freedom of association. But, as I also said above, the FW Act’s prescription for freedom of association extends to the right to be or not be a member of a union and the right to engage or not engage in industrial activity, which is the same right as is prescribed by s 22(2) of the Human Rights Act, to which the ETU, CEPU and PGEU refer in their joint submissions.²⁴⁹ The balance lies in the freedom to choose without undue pressure, including from an employer.

The ETU, CEPU and PGEU rely on the Human Rights Act in opposition to aspects of the Draft Guidelines that deal with restrictions on: union paraphernalia; non-working delegates; delegates administering inductions; and union-nominated hires.²⁵⁰ But the Human Rights Act does not extend to effectively allowing a union to require an employer to display union paraphernalia. An employer at a construction site is a lawful occupier who is entitled to control what comes onto the site. As an occupier, the construction employer or head contractor owes a duty of care as well as a duty under the WHS Act to ensure the site is a safe place of work. Nor does the Human Rights Act extend effectively to allowing a union to administer site inductions, which are “the responsibility of management and cannot be delegated” under the Draft Guidelines; or allowing union delegates the freedom to simply not perform work for an employer.²⁵¹

As to union-nominated labour, there are sound reasons for ensuring that a contractor is free to choose when it comes to hiring workers and, again, the Human Rights Act does not effectively dictate otherwise. At [108] the ETU, CEPU and PGEU say:

This proposition cannot be accepted. The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions, enshrined by s 22(2) of the Human Rights Act, is not infringed by not permitting those matters. Workers are still free to associate as they like, and to form, join or not form whatever associations they choose.

The ETU, CEPU and PGEU also seek to rely on s 21 of the Human Rights Act, which they set out at [105] of their submission dated 14 August 2026. Subsection (2) of s 21 provides:

The ETU, CEPU and PGEU jointly submit in [106] that “Prohibiting the display of union logos, mottos, and signage, which Part 9 of the [Draft] Guidelines does, is a restriction on expression imposed by a government instrument.” For the reasons stated above, this does not restrict freedom of expression in general, but in effect prioritises the lawful rights and obligations of a construction employer or head contractor who is the occupier of a construction site during construction in relation to items that may be brought onto that site. In my view, it does not infringe s 21 of the Human Rights Act.

The ETU, CEPU and PGEU also rely, albeit very briefly, on international conventions, namely the International Labour Organisation Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise, 1948) and 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949). They submit that both conventions “are fundamental conventions under the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”.²⁵² The ETU, CEPU and PGEU note that Article 2 of the 1998 Declaration relevantly provides:

As noted above, in my view the Recommended Code does not restrict freedom of association, nor does it infringe s 22 of the Human Rights Act. International conventions are only enforceable in domestic law if they have been incorporated into or enacted in domestic law (except to the extent that they may create a legitimate expectation for administrative law purposes (which is not relevant here)): see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. In any event, the international obligations to promote freedom of association and recognise the right to collective bargaining are met by the FW Act and are not removed or diminished by the Recommended Code.

To the extent there is a call for the “relaxation” of right of entry laws, it is sufficient to note that the evidence to date does not suggest this to be a wise course. Pending delivery of the Final Report, the prudent approach would appear to be to maintain the guardrails as expressed in the 2013 Qld Guidelines.

The Recommended Code’s third objective is:

In support of the workplace health and safety objective, clause 8 of the Recommended Code provides that workplace health and safety obligations must be actively addressed by all industry participants, and that all parties must meet their WHS obligations according to relevant laws.

This obligation requires participants to have effective workplace health and safety risk management processes, and to be able to demonstrate how they will achieve the safety objectives of the Recommended Code.²⁵³ It also requires senior managers to be proactively involved in, and committed to, achieving safety objectives, and to consult with other parties about resolving safety issues.²⁵⁴

As I have explained earlier in this Interim Report, the Recommended Code is effectively a government procurement policy.²⁵⁵ The Recommended Code seeks to improve productivity and obtain value for money for public infrastructure projects. But that is not its sole aim. The Recommended Code also seeks to use the Queensland Government’s significant purchasing power to “promote the highest standards of safety practice in the industry”²⁵⁶ on construction sites across Queensland. That objective is in the interests of the broader Queensland community.

Safety-related objectives are not novel to industry codes of practice. Prior industry codes have included safety objectives as part of their requirements. Indeed, Mr Hadgkiss gave evidence in the Commission to this effect. Relevantly, Mr Hadgkiss explained that:²⁵⁷

The Recommended Code seeks to achieve its safety-related objectives by both reinforcing and supplementing the existing health and safety obligations under the WHS Act.

Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson both gave evidence that they had observed safety improvements during the operation of the ABCC and prior codes. Specifically, Mr Hadgkiss gave evidence that in every jurisdiction where he had observed an active regulator administering an effective code, there had been corresponding improvements to productivity, safety, and freedom of association within the industry.

In addition to improvements in safety, Mr Jenkinson gave evidence that during his experience of enforcing prior codes, he observed contractors and senior executives take an active role in complying with the code requirements.

Relevantly, Mr Jenkinson gave evidence that:²⁵⁸

That a contractor would be incentivised to comply with a code in order to secure further government construction contracts may seem obvious on its face. Indeed, that is what prior codes have sought to achieve.

However, hearing evidence from a qualified former regulator, of the active role taken by board members and executives of construction companies to comply with prior codes, reinforces the notion that the financial incentive of securing future government construction contracts is an effective mechanism of encouraging compliance.

Given this, it seems prudent to me for the Recommended Code to include provisions designed to improve safety on construction sites in Queensland. In any event, seeking to reinforce outcomes directed towards WHS is plainly a sound objective. As a matter of good policy it makes sense for government, as a project owner, to insist upon compliance with safety legislation and reinforce this with certain specific requirements. In my view it would be remiss of a procurement process, involving major project construction, to do otherwise. Similarly, it would be remiss of me, if not somewhat perverse, to remove from the 2013 Qld Guidelines those provisions aimed at reinforcing safety outcomes.

In cross-examination, Senior Counsel for the Administrator put to Mr Hadgkiss that:

In response to this line of questioning, Mr Hadgkiss confirmed that he had not undertaken any empirical analysis of safety and stated that safety on sites has a multitude of causal factors.²⁶¹

That Mr Hadgkiss had not performed an analysis of the safety benefits of prior codes or the ABCC does not diminish his evidence of safety improvements that he observed during his close to two decades of administering and enforcing prior codes in the construction industry.

Mr Hadgkiss was presented to the Commission as an expert witness with significant industry expertise. He served as the Commissioner of the ABCC from 2 December 2016 to September 2017 and as Director of the Office of the Fair Work Building and Construction Industry Inspectorate from 2013 to 2016. Prior to those senior positions, Mr Hadgkiss had served as a Director of the Victorian Government’s Construction Code Compliance Unit from March 2012 to October 2013 and as the Deputy Commissioner of the ABCC from 2005 to 2009.²⁶²

A witness with those credentials is qualified to provide evidence of their observations working in the field. Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence, based on his observations, assisted my decision to recommend the Recommended Code.

The Administrator’s cross-examination was aimed at demonstrating that there was no positive correlation between the ABCC’s operations and safety outcomes. Mr Hadgkiss’ response was instructive: there are a multitude of factors that contribute to safety on construction sites.²⁶³ In my opinion, these factors include safety policies and practices, the identification and implementation of relevant safety-related controls, management, training, weather conditions, scheduling and the degree of high risk work being performed (such as working at heights).

Similar to the limitations of statistical analysis of productivity, it would be difficult to isolate the impact of an industry code or regulator on the safety outcomes in any statistical analysis.

Given this, I am not persuaded that the absence of any empirical or statistical analysis by Mr Hadgkiss of the safety benefits of a code is a reason to not include clauses in the Recommended Code that have the objective of improving safety on construction sites in Queensland. Further, as mentioned earlier, there are good policy reasons to have in place a requirement to meet safety standards as part of a procurement process in respect of major project construction.

In their written submissions dated 14 August 2026, the Commission has already heard extensive evidence of safety matters in various case studies. However, those case studies are not yet the subject of findings. Findings in respect of those case studies, and safety, will occur in my Final Report, once all interested parties have been afforded procedural fairness with respect to those case studies.

Further, the unions contended that the academic consensus is that health and safety representatives and unions play a positive role in preventative health and safety, even in hostile labour relations climates.²⁶⁴ I assume, without deciding, that this is correct. However, the Recommended Code does not remove any statutory rights that union delegates or health and safety representatives have under the FW Act or the WHS Act.

Any inconsistency between the Recommended Code and the FW Act is dealt with in clause 2.6 of the Recommended Code, which provides that:

That position is consistent with s 109 of the Constitution, which provides that where a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.

Much of the Recommended Code has a history stretching over three decades.²⁶⁵ One clause that is new is clause 5.1(q).²⁶⁶ I recommend that clause specifically (and the Code in general) to try to ensure that the so-called BPIC policy and the clauses I refer to below do not continue in operation, or their effect is otherwise moderated.

BPIC began with the Best Practice Principles in May 2018.²⁶⁷ In November 2018, the Best Practice Principles were first applied retrospectively to the North Queensland Stadium by a Deed of Variation signed between DHPW and Watpac.²⁶⁸ In October 2019, the “Minimum Conditions” were trialled on the refurbishment of the Cairns Convention Centre Project,²⁶⁹ as an early model of a draft BPIC document which were later developed by different departments for different sectors. In February 2020, this was shortly followed by the implementation of project-based BPIC for the Southern Queensland Correctional Precinct.²⁷⁰

I have heard evidence of how the model developed in DHPW spread to other departments and agencies, for example, DTMR developed a BPIC applicable to transport projects and applied it from late 2020.²⁷¹

As can be seen from the brief history above, trying to identify, with precision, the terms of the BPIC policy is a difficult exercise. The reason for this is that as a policy, it developed in a way that is presently unclear. The evidence, as it is, suggests that it was developed largely in the absence of public consultation,²⁷² without precise modelling,²⁷³ and further as it expanded from one department to another, it changed, at least in part, in form.

Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some broad aspects of BPIC policy at least insofar as this Interim Report is concerned. To that end, it seems that it is appropriate to examine the latest iteration of the BPIC policy being the 2023 - 2027 Building BPIC. It runs close to 270 pages and was one of the last versions of BPIC published by the previous State Labor government before the policy was suspended on 14 November 2024 and eventually abolished from 1 January 2026.

Given not all evidence has yet been heard in the BPIC Case Study, I make no findings in this Interim Report about the reasons why the former government introduced BPIC; the process by which it did so; how it was implemented by individual departments and agencies; or the conduct of any person or organisation in connection with BPIC and reserve my full findings in respect of it until my Final Report.

Though it seems counterintuitive, even though the BPIC policy was abolished on 1 January 2026, the arrangements that it gave rise to might live on. The reason I say that the continuing effect (if any) of the BPIC policy and its clauses should cease is not because the Queensland Government has repealed the policy, nor because the QPC has sought to quantify the damage that the policy did, but rather because there is sufficient evidence available to me based on:

By clause 2 of the 2023 – 2027 Building BPIC, the key objectives of BPIC are identified as setting minimum employment terms on government-funded projects so that those projects “conform with best practice industrial relations”, promoting safe working conditions, work/life balance and a comfortable standard of living, and maximising productivity and minimising lost time through genuine consultation and collaboration.

In contrast to the Recommended Code which pursues cost-effectiveness and value for money for taxpayers as the primary aim, BPIC put workforce-orientated objectives ahead of cost-effectiveness.

Before turning to those clauses, I will explain the nature of this assessment. It is an assessment of what the plain text of the clauses required and permitted, it is not an assessment of how they were applied on any particular project.

Looking at the plain meaning of these clauses, the 2023 – 2027 Building BPIC contains the following features:

The mechanism that gives BPIC its reach is found in clauses 1 and 24 whereby contractors were required to have in place “legally binding and enforceable workplace arrangements with conditions of employment that meet or exceed the minimum Conditions of Employment required by this BPIC Policy” and were “required to have subcontractors/suppliers implement such workplace arrangements”. That requirement extended to labour hire.

These provisions, commonly described as “jump up” clauses, mean that the BPIC conditions were a mandatory condition of being able to work on a State project, at every level of the supply chain. A subcontractor whose existing enterprise agreement provided different rates or arrangements was required to “jump up” to the BPIC conditions to take part in the work. This matters to each of the clauses that follow. It is the reason each entitlement in the BPIC operated as a mandatory, uniform term, not as one option among others. It also means that the effect of each clause was felt not only by large head contractors, which may be well placed to absorb it, but by smaller subcontractors and suppliers for whom the required change would be proportionately much greater.

Appendix 1 sets the rates of pay to be paid to workers on BPIC projects. In tandem with clauses 1 and 24, those rates apply to effectively every contractor on site.

One way a contractor can offer the State a better price is through the terms on which it engages and organises its workforce. Appendix 1 takes that component out of competition. Every tenderer must price on the same mandated rates, whatever its existing arrangements, the location or scale of the project, or the state of the local labour market. Where a contractor’s existing rates are below the Appendix 1 rates, the difference must be priced into its tender and is ultimately borne by the State.

The mandated rates are, moreover, well above the relevant modern award rates. I accept that there is debate about the right comparison for measuring how far BPIC rates exceeded what would otherwise have been paid, but the concern is not only that the rates are high, it is that a single mandated rate removes the competitive tension that would otherwise bear on the price the State pays. A mechanism of that kind has an evident capacity to result in higher costs than one in which contractors are free to compete on the terms they offer.

Appendix 3 of the 2023 – 2027 Building BPIC establishes that RDOs are subject to a fixed calendar and change can only follow consultation and agreement with the applicable union, per clause 35 of the 2023 – 2027 Building BPIC.

A contractor cannot stagger RDOs across its workforce to keep the site operating, or move an RDO to recover time lost to wet weather, without the union’s agreement. RDO arrangements are common in the industry, and I make no criticism of RDOs as such. The concern is the combination of a fixed calendar, imposed on every contractor, and a requirement for a third party’s agreement before it can be adjusted. That combination limits a contractor’s ability to manage the program of work and has a clear capacity to add time and cost to a project.

By clause 33 of the 2023 – 2027 Building BPIC, the ability to work outside the ordinary “span of hours” between 6:00am and 6:00pm, alter start and finishing times, or work on a Saturday following a Monday RDO are all subject to union agreement.

Requiring a union’s agreement before any of these steps can be taken gives a third party, which is not a party to the construction contract and does not bear its risks, the capacity to delay or prevent decisions about how the work is to be carried out. Even where agreement is given, the need to obtain it adds time and uncertainty. Where it is withheld, or made conditional, the contractor has no means of recovering lost time. In an industry where the timely sequencing of work is critical to cost and completion, I regard that as a significant concern.

By clause 43 of the 2023 – 2027 Building BPIC, paid union stop work meetings of up to two hours (“or more by agreement”) may be held during working time but “no more than 1 meeting per shift”. In tandem with this, in respect of metal and engineering workers, per Part 5 which applied to those workers, “each quarter, the Union may convene a meeting of Union members of up to 30 minutes duration during working hours”.

I accept that there may be good reasons for union meetings, and value in them, in particular circumstances. The question is whether it is appropriate for the State to require, as a condition of every contract, that such meetings be paid for and held in working time. Imposed universally, and permitted at such a regular frequency, these provisions have an evident capacity to reduce available working time and so to add to the cost and duration of projects.

Clause 55 mandates that certain roles, namely union delegates, first aid attendants, amenities attendants, hoist drivers, crane crews (except where supplied by a specialist company or subcontractor), gate persons, primary traffic attendant roles (except where supplied by a subcontractor as ancillary to the scope of works), and a reasonable number of labourers and tradespeople, be engaged by a principal contractor directly as employees only, which leaves no room to engage such workers through indirect means which may be required to fulfil certain needs at different times.

A contractor’s need for particular skills could vary over the life of a project, and from one project to another. However, BPIC requires a contractor to carry the fixed costs of permanent employees for work that may only be needed intermittently. That is a further constraint on the contractor’s ability to organise its workforce efficiently, and one with a capacity to add to cost.

These clauses should not be considered individually, but together. Their effect is cumulative. A contractor engaged on a BPIC project was required to pay mandated rates; to stop work according to a fixed RDO calendar; to obtain the union’s agreement before working outside standard hours or recovering lost days; to provide paid meetings in working time; to fill certain roles only with direct employees; and to ensure that each of its subcontractors and suppliers did the same. Each requirement limits the contractor’s flexibility in a different way, and each removes from competition a matter on which tenderers might otherwise have offered the State a better cost outcome.

Taken together, and applied uniformly across every State building project and its supply chain, they have, in my view, a clear and substantial capacity to increase the cost and time of delivering public infrastructure.

This view was supported by the evidence of Mr Long on behalf of the CCF QLD, who similarly described the restrictive impact these clauses had on contractors, which “resemble a pattern enterprise agreement with highly restrictive and costly provisions”.²⁷⁴

It is important to be clear about the nature of my conclusion. It is a conclusion about what the clauses required and permitted. It is not a finding that any particular clause was causative of particular delay or cost on any particular project.

Many of the matters the clauses deal with, such as rates of pay, RDOs, meetings, and hours of work are commonly dealt with in enterprise agreements. The difficulty with BPIC is different. It removed those matters from bargaining at the enterprise level and from competition between tenderers, and in several instances it gave a third party, the relevant union, the power to agree to or withhold changes to how work is organised.

It is that combination of uniformity, compulsion and third-party control that gives rise to the concerns I have identified. Whether, and to what extent, that capacity was realised on particular projects is a matter that the further evidence called in the BPIC Case Study may illuminate and its full assessment is best left for determination in the Final Report after all the evidence is heard.

I do not need to wait for the rest of the BPIC Case Study to reach these conclusions about the nature of these clauses. They rest on the terms of the document, which further evidence cannot change. That evidence will go to how and why BPIC was introduced and implemented, and to the extent of its effect on particular projects. It may bear on the extent of concerns I have identified, but not on whether they exist.

The Commission’s Terms of Reference require me to inquire into the Cross River Rail Project; the Centenary Bridge Upgrade and the Gold Coast Light Rail Project.²⁷⁵ In respect of each of those three case studies, relevant evidence has been heard from the contractor, the State, or both, which attempted to quantify in some way the cost of BPIC, which is the best evidence of the cost of BPIC before the Commission, to date. On each project, the evidence at this stage suggests that BPIC contributed to increased cost in delivery of government-funded infrastructure.

There have been other projects referred to in the evidence which can be classified as BPIC projects, such as the Cairns Convention Centre, but at this stage, the most extensive evidence as to project cost has been led in relation to the Cross River Rail Project, the Centenary Bridge Project and the Gold Coast Light Rail Project, which is why each has been selected for analysis for this Interim Report. I anticipate that other evidence will be led in respect of the other relevant projects, which will be dealt with in my Final Report.

The Commission has heard evidence in relation to the Cross River Rail Project, one of the most significant civil infrastructure projects being constructed in and around the Brisbane CBD. The works encompass construction of new rail lines from Dutton Park to Bowen Hills via the boring of twin 5.9km rail tunnels underneath the Brisbane River and the CBD, as well as the construction of new train stations and upgrades to existing train stations (underground and above surface), together with related infrastructure.²⁷⁶

The Cross River Rail Project was originally forecast in the Queensland Government’s Capital Statement for 2016/2017 to cost approximately $5 billion.²⁷⁷ However, the cost has increased as follows:

Combining the impacts of BPIC and associated union activity, Mr Sanfilippo’s evidence was that the estimated additional cost on the Tunnel, Stations and Development component of the Cross River Rail Project was as at about August 2024 approximately $580 million,²⁸¹ which comprised $351 million between July 2023 – July 2024,²⁸² and $229 million for earlier years.²⁸³

Cross River Rail was not a BPIC project as such. But Mr Sanfilippo described BPIC as having raised labour and subcontractor costs across South East Queensland, including on projects to which it did not apply. He attributed this to fewer subcontractors being willing to tender and higher margins among those who remained.²⁸⁴ Therefore the evidence about BPIC on this project concerns the ripple effect the BPIC policy had on the broader market. In my view, this followed the mandatory nature of BPIC’s clauses and conditions on projects to which it applied. This accords with evidence given by other witnesses, Mr Long and Ms Hawkswood.²⁸⁵

Mr Sanfilippo was cross-examined by Senior Counsel for the CFMEU Administrator on the methodology adopted and conclusions reached in the report.²⁸⁶ Mr Sanfilippo’s evidence, supported by the accounts of other witnesses who have given similar evidence about the effect on the broader market, is capable of supporting a conclusion that BPIC, through its effect on the broader market, materially increased costs on the project. Doing the best I can, I estimate the impact of BPIC upon the scale of cost increases in the order of $500 million. This estimate is not precise and is merely my best guess at this stage. No doubt, by the time of the Final Report, greater precision will be achieved. This rough estimate amounts to an approximately 10% increase in cost.

The Centenary Bridge Upgrade was the first DTMR project to incorporate BPIC into the tender process.²⁸⁷ The Centenary Bridge Upgrade involves the construction of a new three-lane northbound bridge, rehabilitation of the existing Centenary Bridge in Brisbane’s western suburbs to create three-lanes southbound as well as upgrades to pedestrian and cyclist pathways.²⁸⁸

The initial budget for the Centenary Bridge Upgrade was $298.5 million.²⁸⁹ The successful tenderers’ bid to deliver the construction contract was $149,208,876.74.²⁹⁰ The evidence was that the incorporation of BPIC into the tender process added an additional $21,920,000.²⁹¹ (later reduced to $20,298,400).²⁹²

This amounts to an approximately 15% increase in cost.

The Gold Coast Light Rail Project involves the extension of a light rail system from Broadbeach South to Burleigh Heads in the Gold Coast area, through the construction of 6.7 kilometres of dual track light rail, eight new stations and the procurement of five additional light rail vehicles.²⁹³

John Holland Pty Ltd became the preferred tenderer for the Gold Coast Light Rail Project in August 2020.²⁹⁴ BPIC did not apply to Gold Coast Light Rail Project when the project was tendered, or when John Holland was announced as the preferred tenderer for the project. It was applied retrospectively to the agreement.²⁹⁵

Evidence presented to the Commission shows that the pre-BPIC design and construct contract value for Gold Coast Light Rail Project was $663 million.²⁹⁶

After some negotiation as there was disagreement between John Holland and the State of Queensland about the assessment of the impact of BPIC,²⁹⁷ John Holland and the State of Queensland ultimately agreed to a “Reimbursable Cost” mechanism under which John Holland was entitled to be “fairly and reasonably compensated” for additional costs attributable to BPIC, with a target not to exceed $150 million.²⁹⁸

There was a contest between John Holland and the State of Queensland as to the correct interpretation of that clause and whether it allowed for an uncapped amount, or not. It is not necessary to make findings in this Interim Report as to that dispute, and I consequently do not do so other than to note the existence of the dispute.

The estimated impact on BPIC cost on Gold Coast Light Rail Project has been quantified on different bases over time. The former Director-General of DTMR, Mr Neil Scales, gave evidence which shows that by November 2021, DTMR provided an update to the Queensland Government on the negotiations of the Transport BPIC on Gold Coast Light Rail Project and the impacts expected. At that time, it was estimated that the overall increase in costs for Gold Coast Light Rail Project due to BPIC was $206.3 million.²⁹⁹

By February 2024, however, John Holland had forecast, under an Improvement Framework Agreement agreed by John Holland and the State, a total BPIC claim of $428.7 million as the additional cost required to complete the project, against the original BPIC target of $150 million.³⁰⁰

The competing contentions as to causation and quantum – and the extent to which the costs claimed by John Holland are properly attributable to BPIC, to the conduct of the CFMEU and other unions, or to other causes – will be addressed in the Final Report. I do not need to make any such finding at this stage.

However, the extent to which even the agreed sum of $150 million represented an additional cost to the State procuring BPIC, I consider that a significant sum given the initial pre-BPIC contract was accepted for $663 million and $150 million represents a 22% increase on the pre-BPIC contract price. On John Holland’s increased estimate by February 2024, that is an additional $428.7 million said to be causative by the application of BPIC, that would represent an increase of 67% of the original tender price

The three projects above provide some evidence of the costs associated with the BPIC policy. They are the best evidence before the Commission to date and serve as a vehicle for me to arrive at a best estimate of the cost impact of BPIC.

Thus, all things considered, I estimate that the cost of the BPIC policy on government infrastructure projects to be in the order of 10 - 30% and therefore regard the figure of 20% as the best estimate available on the evidence to date. This estimate is subject to further refinement in the Final Report. Further evidence is very likely to be adduced about other projects impacted by BPIC and further submissions and evidence will be directed to this in the Final Report. Accordingly, this estimate may be altered one way or another in the Final Report.

However, I consider the estimate of 20% to be a conservative view. In coming to this view, I am dealing only with the increase in costs caused by the implementation of BPIC, leaving aside for the moment any quantification as to delays caused by BPIC. In summary, that estimate, based on the three projects above, is derived from estimates of substantial costs increases in the case of:

Given my conclusions based on the actual evidence before the Commission in relation to the three projects I have discussed above, it is unnecessary at this stage to have regard to the conclusions expressed by the QPC in relation to its assessment of the costs of BPIC. That assessment, it should be noted, was different to the one I am performing here, and was an assessment which relied on a key assumption being a 30 – 50% increase in wages to then derive a prospective assessment of the cost of BPIC.

On the evidence available to me, and for the very limited purposes of this Interim Report (i.e. recommending the adoption of the Recommended Code), it does not matter whether the QPC’s estimate is accurate or not. This is not to say that the Unions’ criticisms of the way in which the QPC modelled its estimate are not without foundation. Merely, that it is unnecessary at this stage to deal with these criticisms as, on any view, given the evidence before the Commission, and the findings I have made above, the impact of BPIC’s legacy upon the construction program envisaged by the Queensland Government would be profoundly deleterious. To put it another way, if the impact of the BPIC policy in terms of the costs of construction is in the order of 20% (as I have found on this preliminary basis in this Interim Report) then the costs of the Queensland Government’s construction program would increase by approximately $24 billion (i.e. 20% increase upon $119 billion spend predicted over the next four years). This is more than sufficient to justify clause 5.1(q), in particular, and the recommendations in general.

The Commission heard evidence from various witnesses that was said to demonstrate that previous iterations of an industry code and regulator improved productivity in Queensland’s construction industry.

Counsel Assisting adduced four types of evidence through Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson:

In submissions dated 14 April 2026, Counsel Assisting submitted that the econometric and statistical evidence set out above supported Counsel Assisting’s case for the Recommended Code.³⁰⁶

In this Section, I address the limitations of the econometric data. I address similar limitations of the statistical data in below Section 16 of this Interim Report. Lastly, I address the observational and opinion evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson in Section 17 of this Interim Report.

The Unions submitted that there was a significant shift in Counsel Assisting’s case between opening the Code Case Study on 14 April 2026 and filing its further written submissions on 3 July 2026.³⁰⁷ The Administrator submitted that, in April 2026, Counsel Assisting opened its case for the reintroduction of a code and a regulator as one of “cause and effect”.³⁰⁸ The Commission was told that a code and a regulator “would drive improvements to safety and productivity on construction sites in Queensland”,³⁰⁹ and that the evidence suggested that effective codes, administered by an independent regulator, “consistently deliver improvements in productivity, protect freedom of association, and promote compliance with statutory industrial relations obligations”.³¹⁰

The Administrator submitted that, following cross-examination of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson on 11 June 2026, nothing of that case survived.³¹¹ It was said that the case had instead been replaced by the “language of possibility”.³¹²

The Administrator submitted that ultimately Counsel Assisting’s case had changed from a position of certainty that a code would bring about productivity increases, to a position that it would be sufficient for me to recommend a code if I found that a code presented “an opportunity” or had the “potential” to improve productivity or safety.³¹³

The Administrator characterised this change as “an abandonment of the causal case” and an invitation for the Commission to recommend significant regulatory intervention on the chance that it might work.³¹⁴

The Administrator submitted that Counsel Assisting’s change in position occurred following the cross-examination of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson, which the Administrator submitted established that:³¹⁵

To the extent that Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson were merely the witnesses through whom econometric and statistical data was introduced, the criticisms of their expertise,³¹⁹ their own independent analysis³²⁰ and their own verification of the underlying data have no merit.³²¹ The underlying econometric and statistical data is either useful or not, or reliable or not. The identity and qualifications of the witness through whom this evidence came to be put before the Commission are neither here nor there.³²²

The Administrator also submitted that the econometric and statistical evidence did not support the contentions advanced by Counsel Assisting.

I agree with the Administrator in part.³²³ I have no regard to the 2013 Independent Economics report. Thus, it is not necessary for me to have regard to the Peetz Anomalies Article.³²⁴ This is not to say that the Peetz criticisms are not valid. But fundamentally, my reason for rejecting the 2013 Independent Economics report is that it is very difficult for an economist to isolate one factor from the multitude of other factors that could sensibly be said to contribute one way or another to productivity changes. For example, the factors that might impact upon productivity and cost effectiveness could include the level of capital investment, innovation, skills and education, competition, regulation, labour supply and management practices, among a multitude of other factors. It is almost impossible to hold all these variables constant and try to isolate the impact of previous federal and state codes and regulators on the productivity of the construction industry, whether in Queensland or nationally. A great deal of ink has been spilled in attempting to establish whether there was any causal link between earlier codes and regulators and changes in productivity. If only for this reason, it is not surprising to me that Peetz was unable to replicate the findings contained in the 2013 Independent Economics report.³²⁵

However, my rejection of the 2013 Independent Economics report does not mean that Counsel Assisting’s case that the Recommended Code would improve productivity “was not made out”. In my view, the Recommended Code does have “the potential to address” unproductive practices and does represent “an opportunity to improve productivity and efficiency”.³²⁶ Indeed, in my view it is likely to do so. In other words, my rejection of the 2013 Independent Economics report does not alter my decision to propose the Recommended Code. As I outlined above in Section 11 of this Interim Report, I have performed an evaluation of the objectives and content of the Recommended Code. This evaluation is unaffected by the rejection of the econometric evidence. In my view, the cumulative impact of jump up clauses, manning restrictions, inflexible RDOs and limitations upon the ability of building contractors to pay and organise their workforce with maximum flexibility can plainly have a detrimental impact on productivity and value for money. That proposition is self-evident and requires no econometric proof.

The 2014 Productivity Commission report is broadly supportive of my rejection of the 2013 Independent Economics report in the sense that the Productivity Commission found that it was likely that “the BIT and ABCC had net positive productivity and cost impacts” but that “the degree to which their impacts did or even reasonably could show up as large improvements in aggregate construction industry productivity is another matter”.³²⁷

Indeed, the Productivity Commission made the related point that “Interactions among work arrangements make it impossible to quantify how individual work arrangements affect the partial performance indicators or performance overall. As well, other factors such as design, project planning, building regulations, tendering practices and the behaviour of clients affect workplace performance. For these reasons, the impacts of work arrangements can be assessed in terms of direction only”.³²⁸

Similarly, I have found that on an analysis of the objectives and the content of the Recommended Code, the implementation of such a code supported by a regulator (to use the words of the 2014 Productivity Commission report) is likely to have “net positive productivity and cost impacts”.³²⁹ This is notwithstanding that such net positive productivity and cost impacts might be impossible to isolate from the many other factors impacting productivity and cost into the future.

Finally, one of the bases upon which the 2014 Productivity Commission report thought it likely that the previous iteration of a federal code and regulator had “net positive productivity and cost impacts”³³⁰ was, in part, the type of expert evidence that I refer to later in Section 17 of this Interim Report (Seventh Reason).³³¹

As I stated in the previous Section, Counsel Assisting relied upon:

This statistical evidence comprised extracts from Australian Bureau of Statistics surveys purporting to show during certain timeframes a decrease in working days lost and a reduction in the level of industrial disputation.³³⁴ Counsel Assisting sought to show that these datasets supported the reintroduction of a code and regulator on the basis that previous iterations of a code (whether federal or state, and supported by a regulator) had caused a reduction in working days lost and a diminution in the level of industrial disputation in the construction industry in Queensland.³³⁵ As the level of working days lost and industrial disputation have the potential to affect productivity (depending upon the nature and extent of these factors), Counsel Assisting thus sought to draw a link between previous iterations of a code and regulator and historic improvements in productivity.³³⁶

The Unions’ position on this point is set out at Section 15 of this Interim Report.³³⁷ In short, I agree with the Unions’ criticisms of the statistical data and have no regard to it. My reason is not that the data was introduced through Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson. As I stated in the previous Section, the data is either good or bad – it is either fit for purpose or it is not. It is irrelevant that it has been received in evidence through one witness as opposed to another.

I have no regard to this evidence for three reasons:

Thus, I give no weight to that statistical evidence, but again this does not detract from my evaluation. That the statistical evidence does not reliably show that previous iterations of a code and regulator impacted the number of working days lost and the level of industrial disputation is neither here nor there. I have found that the objectives and content of the Recommended Code are, on their face, likely to have a beneficial impact upon the cost effectiveness of project delivery and on productivity.³⁴⁰

There have been competing submissions from Counsel Assisting³⁴¹ and the Administrator for the CFMEU in relation to whether Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson should be characterised as “experts”.³⁴²

The first step in determining this contest is to note that the rules of evidence do not apply to the Commission.

Section 17 of the COI Act provides that a commission, in the exercise of any of its functions or powers, “shall not be bound by the rules or practice of any court or tribunal as to procedure or evidence, but may conduct its proceedings and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks proper”.

In accordance with s 17 of the COI Act, the Commission has not rigidly applied the rules of evidence; rather, it has used the rules of evidence as guidance in its public hearings. That guidance has extended to permitting counsel to object to a line of questioning, and has informed my decisions in relation to various objections in the course of public hearings.

A similar approach with respect to using the rules of evidence as a guideline has been adopted in previous royal commissions and commissions of inquiry.³⁴³

However, as is made clear by s 17 of the COI Act, the rules of evidence do not strictly apply. Other than using the rules of evidence as a guide, particularly to ensure that procedural fairness and natural justice were afforded to parties and interested persons, the Commission has operated consistently with s 17 of the COI Act.

Strictly speaking, the Commission is not obliged to identify whether a witness is a lay witness or an expert witness, within the meaning of the ordinary rules of evidence. However, characterising certain witnesses as experts assists in assessing the weight to be attributed to a particular witness’ evidence. Below in Section 17 of this Interim Report, I explain why I regard both Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson as experts in relation to implementing, monitoring and enforcing prior industry codes.

I have found that both the objectives and the substance of the Recommended Code are likely to improve productivity and the cost effectiveness of the Queensland Government’s upcoming large scale construction programme. Moreover, I have found that, on balance, the objectives and the contents of the Recommended Code are likely to enhance the effectiveness of the schemes promoting freedom of association and occupational health and safety in Sections 12 and 13 of this Interim Report. I have found that this is largely an evaluative exercise and can be undertaken without historic econometric or statistical data (or indeed without econometric modelling which attempts to isolate the effectiveness or impact of one factor among many). Indeed, I have found above that an evaluative approach is the preferred approach.

My conclusions in this regard are supported at least in part by the expert evidence given by Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson.³⁴⁴ Despite my dismissal of econometric and statistical evidence – much of which was introduced through Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson – they remain qualified industry experts. Indeed given their history and experience (particularly that of Mr Hadgkiss), it is difficult to contemplate witnesses with greater expertise.

Mr Hadgkiss was the inaugural Director of the BIT from 2002 to 2005³⁴⁵ and later the Deputy Commissioner of the ABCC from 2005 to 2009.³⁴⁶ He was in effect the creator of the Victorian Building Code and the inaugural Director of the Victorian Government’s Construction Code Compliance Unit from March 2012 to October 2013.³⁴⁷ That Victorian Code was the basis for the Queensland Code and supporting regulator which was in operation from (Insert dates). Mr Hadgkiss then became the Director of the Office of the Fair Work Building and Construction Industry Inspectorate from 2013 to 2016,³⁴⁸ and thereafter, the Commissioner of the ABCC from 2016 to 2017.³⁴⁹ In short, he has held every important position concerning the operation of the type of building codes currently being considered by the Commission and indeed was the principal architect of the code upon which the Recommended Code is based and further was the person who, in effect, shaped this model of regulation as the inaugural Director of the BIT over two decades ago. He has had experience at both the federal and state levels in this regard.

Mr Jenkinson is a highly qualified former regulator with extensive experience working for the ABCC, the IBIT and the BIT.³⁵⁰ He was an investigator at the IBIT and BIT from 2003 to March 2005.³⁵¹ From March 2005 to April 2012 he was employed by the ABCC as an Inspector and also as a State Director of the ABCC’s Queensland Operations.³⁵²

Mr Jenkinson also worked as the Director, Building and Construction Compliance Branch at the Queensland Government’s Department of Justice from August 2013 to July 2014, and from 2016 to 2022 he was again employed by the ABCC in the role of Director of Operations for the ABCC’s Northern Region. In that role he had oversight of the ABCC’s investigative function across Queensland and the Northern Territory.³⁵³

The Administrator does not suggest that the expertise of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson should have been expanded upon. This concession is correct. Clearly they are experts; Mr Hadgkiss particularly so.

But the Administrator does suggest that the basis for the conclusions expressed by Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson should have been developed in greater detail.³⁵⁴ The Administrator submitted that whilst their work histories are set out at length in the evidence, what they observed within those roles is not and that an opinion drawn from experience can be tested only if the experience is described.³⁵⁵ There is some force in this submission but one has to be careful that the necessity for an expert to set out the basis for his conclusions does not become a triumph of form over substance.

Neither Mr Hadgkiss nor Mr Jenkinson described the observations underlying the opinions they expressed. Nor did they identify the industry participants whose feedback they relied on, or the projects to which they referred,³⁵⁶ in support of their observations that previous codes improved productivity in the construction industry. No doubt it would have been preferable for the witnesses to set out the substance of what they observed, so that the factual foundation for their opinions could be examined, and I accept that these omissions may have made it harder for the Administrator to test that part of their evidence in cross-examination. That shortcoming, does not detract from the fact that their opinions were grounded in their experience. Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson have a combined total of more than 30 years’ experience in regulating the construction industry, and I regard the evidence of witnesses who have, in effect, devoted their careers to that work as being of real value. This is particularly so in a commission of inquiry, where the rules of evidence do not apply.

As I set out earlier, Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson each have long and significant professional experience in administering and enforcing industry codes in the building and construction sector. Their evidence is based on that extensive experience, including their discussions with, and feedback from, other industry participants. Despite its shortcomings, the evidence is relevant and probative to the matters I must determine. More detail would have strengthened the evidence and made it easier to assess. However, the absence of that further detail does not deprive the evidence of probative value or justify the evidence being ignored. Accordingly, I have had regard to the evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson as experts in the field, while taking into account the limitations the Administrator identified. That evidence buttresses the conclusions I have reached on my own reading of the purposes and content of the Recommended Code and its predecessors.

Noting the limitations on the use of the econometric and statistical data identified above, I have found evidence from industry participants with experience in the field both relevant and useful.

For example, Mr Hadgkiss gave evidence of his observations from working in various roles with former regulators that:³⁵⁷

Further, Mr Hadgkiss attributed those corresponding improvements to:³⁵⁸

The Recommended Code in this Interim Report also seeks to achieve similar results through a carefully considered set of enforceable requirements.

Another aspect of Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence that I found compelling and which supports my recommendation to reintroduce a code and regulator, was Mr Hadgkiss’ opinion that the:³⁵⁹

This evidence goes beyond statistical attempts to quantify productivity improvements and considers the flow-on effects from a code. The message of reform and expectation around improved productivity, safety and compliance is an important component of ushering in change.

I found this aspect of Mr Hadgkiss’ evidence particularly helpful with respect to the impact that the reintroduction of a code could have on the industry, especially with respect to re-setting expectations of productivity, safety and compliance standards required to be met.

My decision to make the recommendations in this Interim Report are also supported by the evidence of Mr Jenkinson.

Relevantly, Mr Jenkinson gave evidence that:³⁶⁰

In relation to compliance with the code, Mr Jenkinson observed construction companies taking a more active role in complying with the code. On this point, Mr Jenkinson said that:³⁶¹

Mr Jenkinson’s evidence on the commercial implications incentivising contractors to ensure compliance on their projects was particularly persuasive to me.

There was additional evidence that addressed the utility and benefits of prior codes, including the evidence of Mr Long.³⁶² However, consistent with my approach to evidence given in other case studies, as explained above in Section 4 of this Interim Report, I make no findings in relation to Mr Long’s evidence in this Interim Report. Findings in relation to Mr Long’s evidence have been reserved for my Final Report.

Therefore, having regard to the evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson and doing the best I can with the evidence before the Commission, my view is that on balance a code and regulator is likely to have a beneficial impact on the Queensland construction industry. The evidence of Mr Hadgkiss and Mr Jenkinson buttresses and supports my views.